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Richard Reeves
The contributors to this volume disagree on a number of
important issues: the role of the market, the animating
purpose of the state, the relationship between individual and
social needs, to pick just a few. But they are unanimous in
their assessment that Labour is in a very deep hole. After
three election victories, and an unprecedented twelve years
in office, the party is falling, broken, to its knees.
Labour is ‘deeply unpopular, stale, directionless and
tired’, according to Lisa Harker and Carey Oppenheim, co-
directors of the Institute for Public Policy Research: ‘Wiped
out in Wales and Scotland, it is already in tatters.’ Compass
chair Neal Lawson writes that Labour ‘is in the eye of the
biggest storm that has ever engulfed it.’ The party has been
‘humiliated’ in the recent local and European polls, and faces
the ‘prospect of a similar rout at the forthcoming general
election,’ according to historian Kevin Jefferys. The general
secretary of the Fabian Society, Sunder Katwala writes: 
‘New Labour has delivered the most successful era of
progressive advance for half a century — and that is clearly
now over.’ And Jon Cruddas MP and Jonathan Rutherford
issue the stark warning that ‘the Labour government faces
the abyss.’
The image of an abyss is a popular one among the
essayists assembled here — and it does not feel like
hyperbole. Labour’s performance in last week’s election was
truly appalling. Pushed by the Liberal Democrats into third
place and below the 20 per cent mark in the local elections,
the party lost its last four county councils. Labour then
limped in third — this time behind the UK Independence
Party — in the European elections. In this poll, Labour was
beaten by the Scottish National Party for the first time in a
UK-wide election; beaten into second place in Wales for the
first time since 1918 (and by the Tories); beaten into fifth
place in the South-East and South-West of England by the
Greens; and beaten into sixth place in Cornwall — behind the
Cornish nationalists. Labour is beaten. The snatching of two
seats by the BNP was perhaps the most painful
consequence of the party’s collapse.
In this volume, which collects the views of a wide
range of thinkers on Labour and the progressive left, there
are few who think Labour can win the next election. All
agree that the task is the longer-term intellectual and
political renewal of the progressive left.
The Labour Party is currently mired in a leadership
crisis. Jefferys points out that Labour has no historical 
form when it comes to dragging leaders out of office. But
the Conservatives have done so three times — to Eden,
Macmillan and Thatcher — and won two of the following
general elections: ‘There is therefore some historical
evidence to suggest a change of guard at No. 10 Downing
Street between elections can improve a party’s fortunes 
in the short term, especially if the new premier appears to
mark a fresh start and presents a different persona to 
the outgoing leader.’ But Jefferys also points out that 
party unity is necessary, if not sufficient, for political 
renewal.
Whether Labour is more likely to unify behind a new
leader than behind Brown is of course a very big question.
But having lost six cabinet ministers in two days, Brown’s
claim to be the person to rally the Labour’s troops looks
weak, to say the least. Political writer Martin Bright thinks it
is time for the torch to pass to a new generation: ‘What is
certain is that until someone grasps the nettle and wrests
control of the party from the dead hand of the New Labour
old guard, the party will continue its drift into oblivion.’ But
Bright fears that the failure of other members of the Cabinet
to follow James Purnell’s lead out of the government
‘demonstrates that he may be the exception that proves the
rule that his generation lacks the political boldness to turn
around Labour’s fortunes.’
David Marquand insists that New Labour was always
electorally reliant on Blair’s ‘charismatic populism’, and that
Brown is simply unable to repeat the trick: ‘charisma can’t
be passed on from one leader to the next like an old
suit…Blair had strewn the Labour Party with star dust; Brown
strewed it with lumps of lead…He doesn’t do visions. He
never has.’ But it is also clear that the crisis goes beyond
well beyond the live question of whether Gordon Brown will
continue in No. 10. The renewal of Labour — of the
progressive left more generally — requires an honest
reckoning of the party’s mistakes, and the mining of fresh
intellectual resources.
The three most consistent critiques of Labour in this
collection are that the party embraced neoliberal economics
too enthusiastically; neglected issues of equality and
8
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9fairness; and relied too heavily on a centralist, top-down
model of state action. Jenni Russell summarises this triple
challenge:
introduction
All too often Labour, with its harsh emphasis on targets, central
controls, efficiency, and the unchallenged primacy of markets, has
left people feeling impotent, unimportant and alarmingly adrift.
Specifically, Labour was too overawed by the power of
finance capital, and too tempted by a debt-fuelled model of
economic growth. Michael Meacher MP urges his party to
‘mark out a clean break from the neoliberal finance capital
New Labour has worshipped for the last decade’. Lawson
warns against ‘Blairite’ commitment to what he calls the
‘market state’ — characterised by ‘the sugar-coated pill of
turbo-consumption leading to a golden age of individualism.’
Maurice Glasman suggests that Labour’s intense commit-
ment to the free market contributed to the credit crunch
and bank bailout: ‘the biggest transfer of wealth from poor
to rich since the Norman Conquest.’
The second critique relates to Labour’s record on
equality and fairness. A number of contributors point to a
mixed record on poverty reduction and inequality since 1997.
‘There has been no lasting change to the inequality in our
society,’ argue Harker and Oppenheim, ‘despite it casting a
long shadow over so many aspects of our lives.’ Meacher
calls for a minimum wage of £7 an hour and a 60p tax rate
on those earning over £250,000 a year; Glasman for a ‘living
wage’ of £7.45 an hour.
Third, the party has relied on what Stuart White calls a
‘Labourist’ approach to governance, with ‘a strong
attachment to the central state’. Harker and Oppenheim
agree that Labour has been ‘unremittingly managerialist,
churning out well-intentioned policies rather than honing a
set of ideas’. Philip Collins, Chair of Demos, points out that
since 1997, more than forty institutions have been
established, and abolished. ‘This faith in a new unit here and
a new coordinating body there is touching but not very
advisable,’ he writes. ‘There is an unpalatable lesson to be
learned — in most case the state did not work as well as its
advocates thought it would.’ Historian Tristram Hunt
similarly warns against ‘ministerial dirigisme’ and suggests
that the current economic crisis ‘has led too many to seek
the familiar, paternalist hand of the man in Whitehall
knowing best.’
So what now? What can Labour do? Four themes run
through much of the collection. Labour should, the
contributors variously argue, be more democratic, more
pluralist, more social, and more liberal.
There is an almost universal call for electoral reform,
with the majority of contributors urging Labour to abandon
first-past-the-post voting in favour of some form of
proportional representation. Other democratic innovations
include the establishment of a citizens’ convention to help
construct a new political system, an idea fleshed out by
Harker and Oppenheim (and not unlike the one held by
Demos on June 4). There are also calls from Asato and
Rushanara Ali, a community activist with the Young
Foundation and Labour parliamentary candidate, for a
democratisation of party structure. Asato writes that
‘Labour’s structures are an unhappy merger of old-
fashioned, soviet-sounding bodies such as the local ‘General
Committee’ and powerless New Labour creations such as
the National Policy Forum.’ She urges embedding ‘citizen
voice’ in local parties by embracing primaries for the
selection of candidates, while Ali wants to recover the sense
of Labour as ‘a party of campaigning (in the broadest sense)
and activism.’
There is, secondly, a strongly pluralist strand in many
of the essays. A number of writers want Labour to engage
more constructively with other parties, or as Stuart White,
the political philosopher puts it, to ‘let go of the arrogant
and false idea that Labour has a monopoly on progressive
politics’. Closer working relationships with the Liberal
Democrats and Greens are urged. Katwala proposes that
Labour could unilaterally decide not to field candidates in
seats where the main duel is between Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats, and consciously draw up a manifesto
that leaves open the possibility of cross-party working in the
event of a hung parliament (for example by dropping plans
for ID cards).
There is a similar demand for more plurality in local
provision, contingent on decentralisation of power away
from central to local government. Too much power has
accrued to the central state, and Labour needs to make
good on its repeated promises of a ‘new localism’. Hunt
reminds us of a civic socialism, one ‘which values the
capacity of the state, but does not regard an increase in
state spending as a virility symbol.’ He offers a partial
defence of Labour’s record, pointing out that ‘the last ten
years have seen a magnificent devolution of power — from
the Scottish Parliament to the Welsh Assembly to the
London Mayor and now (albeit belatedly) further autonomy
for local councils in terms of revenue-raising powers and the
10
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much overlooked city-region status.’ But now Labour has 
to release power to local government, to recognise that 
‘the most innovative and intelligent public servants are 
now to be found in the town hall not Whitehall’. For the
decentralisers assembled in this volume — and they are all
decentralisers — the current crisis provides the right
moment to rethink the balance of power between centre
and locality.
The third leitmotif of this collection is a repeated
emphasis on the need for Labour to recover a stronger
sense of the social — of communities, civic associations and
social institutions. ‘We need a politics of social life’ is the
claim of Cruddas and Rutherford: ‘We need a philosophy of
the individual in society and a political culture that values
the social goods that give security, meaning and value to
people: home, family, friendships, good work, locality, and
imaginary communities of belonging.’ Cruddas and
Rutherford align themselves, in this respect at least, with the
‘red Tory’ philosophy of Phillip Blond, director of the
Progressive Conservatism Project at Demos, who writes
here that ‘ordinary citizens want society back; they want
control of their own lives and the ability to form
communities with others. They want to create a civic
‘middle’ that gives them back their society.’ Ali adds a more
political dimension, arguing that Labour needs to become
more of a ‘social movement’ again, and reconnect with the
day-to-day issues of ordinary people. In similar vein,
Glasman, Lawson, Meacher and Alan Finlayson urge a new
focus on ‘civic’ association, ‘relational power’, the ‘common
good’ and ‘social-ism’ in place of ‘individual-ism’. Building on
the critique that Labour became too wedded to
‘commercialisation’, ‘commodification’ and a ‘market state’,
these new social-ists are concerned to find new ways of
articulating the necessary interconnectedness of citizens.
This communitarian emphasis contrasts with the
robust radical liberalism of Collins and Jowell, who both
advocate putting more power in the hands of individual
citizens (a disclosure is necessary at this point: I’m with the
radical liberals). Collins articulates a liberal republican
approach, based on a conviction that each person decides
for themselves what a good life is for themselves. This is not
a Blairite versus Brownite contest, Collins insists: ‘The
intriguing axis in Labour politics will be quite different. There
will be, on one side of the argument, those that genuinely
want to disperse power and, on the other, those that think
that central government is usually the answer. The
distinction is not hard and fast. Those who want to make
11
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people powerful do not want to give up the power of the
state. On the contrary, left-liberals are keenly aware that the
power of the state is a potent part of their armoury — It’s
just not their weapon of choice.’
The divide may not in fact be quite as great as it
appears. Lawson, who writes most fiercely against the pro-
market individualism of the ‘Blairites’, also suggests that
‘social-ism should be defined as the ability of people to
exert the maximum control over their lives’ — a sentiment
with which radical liberals would warmly agree.
Katwala and Marquand strike a middle course between
the liberal and communitarian positions, with Katwala
suggesting that a focus on more equal life chances, or the
‘fight against fate’ combines liberal ends and social
democrat means: ‘This argument also has the potential to
fuse together liberal and social democratic agendas: if
autonomy is the liberal end, then the social democratic
concern is for the distribution of autonomy.’ On
macroeconomics, Marquand urges an alternative to both
‘the neo-liberal gods Gordon Brown worshipped as
Chancellor’, and to ‘Keynesian social democracy of the post-
war period with its faith in economic growth, fiscal stimuli
and macro-economic manipulation from the centre’ — but is
sceptical that Labour can find it.
These four values — democracy, pluralism, social-ism
and liberalism — provide starting points for the ongoing
debate about the future of the progressive left. They
sometimes collide. Values cannot always be made to fit
neatly together, and it would be helpful to admit when this is
the case, and have the argument out.
But there is another requirement if Labour is to stand
any chance of renewal, which is a change of political and
intellectual culture. The party is beset by factionalism and
fear. The era of heavy whipping and heavy top-spin must
end, says Asato: ‘Labour has to get away from its fixer
mentality of thuggish whips and bully boys threatening
excommunication.’ Bright writes that for Labour to survive ‘it
needs to rediscover a facility for the two things it once did
best: efficient political campaigning and radical policymaking.’
Similarly, Labour needs to move beyond the banners
of yesterday’s battles and engage constructively and
respectfully in a proper contest of ideas. As Collins suggests,
‘there should be a moratorium on the divisions of Blairite
and Brownite, Old and New Labour, left and right,
individualist and collectivist. All of them replay ancient
blood-feuds that don’t matter and none of them will yield
anything interesting.’
introduction
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We should, however, be under no illusions that the
renewal of the progressive left will be quick, or easy. The
task is very great. This week Alistair Darling said: ‘We need
to set clearly what we are for, our vision for the country and
our purpose for being in government.’ All of this requires, of
course that Labour itself knows what it is for. Harold Wilson
famously declared that Labour was a moral crusade or it was
nothing. Successful crusades require a clear ideological
purpose, an inspiring leadership and an accurate map of the
destination. Right now, Labour lacks all three. As this
collection demonstrates, there are some rich intellectual
resources available for the renewal of the progressive left.
But the work needs to begin now.
Richard Reeves is the director of Demos.
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staring into the abyss:
lessons from Labour’s
past
Kevin Jefferys
What lessons might be drawn from Labour’s recent history
as it turns from reflecting on humiliation in the local and
European elections to the prospect of a similar rout at the
forthcoming general election? While ideology, policy and
vision stand at the heart of any process of renewal for the
future, questions of presentation and leadership cannot be
ignored. In particular the issue of how united or divided the
party appears in the eyes of the public has always been
central to Labour’s fortunes; any political strategy, however
bold or compelling, can never fulfil its potential if it fails to
command broad approval among those charged with
conveying it to the electorate. In this respect, a glance back
at how the party has reacted to previous election defeats
provides a timely warning. Each of the three occasions since
the Second World War when Labour relinquished its place
as the governing party has been followed by outbreaks of
internal strife, twice contributing to the party enduring
protracted spells in the electoral wilderness.
Attlee’s defeat at the hands of Churchill in 1951
remains the party’s most curious setback in the modern era.
Although Labour’s landslide 1945 majority all but
disappeared at the general election in 1950, and despite
exhaustion among the senior figures that built the welfare
state out of the rubble of war, Attlee need not have gone to
the country when he did in 1951. During 1952 the world
economy entered a phase of rapid growth from which
Labour may well have benefited had they remained longer in
office. A further irony was that by piling up huge majorities
in its working-class, industrial heartlands, Labour actually
won more votes in 1951, though fewer seats, than the Tories.
With a whopping 48.8 per cent share of the vote — an
achievement in the realms of fantasy today — it was small
wonder that Labour was confident of an early return to
power. Hugh Dalton, Attlee’s first post-war chancellor,
described the 1951 result in his diary as ‘wonderful’, believing
the Conservatives would quickly crumble in office.
As it turned out, Dalton was wide of the mark.
Thirteen years in opposition followed primarily because
Churchill and his successors proved adept at exploiting
steady economic growth during the 1950s. But Labour
undermined any chance it had of regaining power by
entering into bitter factional quarrels. Bevanite left-wingers
advocated building on the nationalisation programme of the
Attlee years as the way forward, and clashed sharply with
the emerging Gaitskellite revisionists, who placed social
equality at the centre of their creed. For voters, the image
was of a party that traded in the unity of the immediate
post-war era for futile tribal conflict. By 1952 Hugh Dalton
was singing an entirely different tune: ‘More hatred, and
more love of hatred’, he wrote, ‘in our party than I ever
remember.’1
In the second example of Labour losing office, Harold
Wilson’s defeat in 1970 was followed by renewed infighting
between the inheritors of the old fundamentalist and
revisionist traditions. Beset with problems over policy —
notably over attitudes towards the European Community,
which Britain joined under Tory premier Ted Heath — the
party again presented a picture of disharmony in opposition.
But unlike in the early 1950s, Labour this time got lucky.
Heath’s decision to gamble by calling an election in the
shadow of the three-day week in 1974 backfired badly.
Wilson’s emollient leadership papered over many of the
internal cracks and he retained sufficient acumen to steer
Labour back to power, though at both the 1974 general
elections the party’s share of the vote, squeezed by a revival
of Liberalism, fell below 40 per cent. This was hardly a
ringing endorsement, and confirmed the end of the age in
which the two main parties garnered the overwhelming
majority of all votes cast.
The final instance of the party surrendering power
came when Callaghan’s administration was swept away in
the aftermath of the ‘winter of discontent’ in 1979. This
crushing defeat has parallels with Labour’s plight thirty
years on: Gordon Brown, like Callaghan, became an
unelected prime minister following the retirement of an
election-winning predecessor, and may similarly be remem-
bered for leaving the party with serious questions being
asked about its ability to survive as an independent force.
The aftermath of 1979 remains a painful memory
etched into the consciousness of Labour activists. Margaret
Thatcher’s assault on state collectivism got off to a shaky
start, with unemployment rising as sharply as her personal
popularity sank by 1981. But as the frustrations of the
Wilson-Callaghan years came to the surface, Labour pressed
the self-destruct button and embarked on full-scale civil war.
15
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Instead of mounting a counter attack on the so-called ‘hard
left’, leading figures on the Labour right decided it was time
to jump ship. Within months of its creation in 1981, the Social
Democratic Party could claim over twenty MPs, mostly
defectors from the Parliamentary Labour Party, aiming to
replace Labour altogether on the centre-left by ‘breaking
the mould’ of politics.
Michael Foot, who replaced Callaghan in 1980, used
the backing of moderate trade unionists to begin a fight-
back against the hard left, beginning moves to expel
members of Militant Tendency from the party. But the
poisonous atmosphere at Westminster and beyond —
combined with savage tabloid attacks on Foot’s leadership 
– meant Labour was in no position to mount an effective
challenge in the early 1980s, especially after Thatcher’s
fortunes were transformed by the Falklands War. Dogged by
personal and ideological divisions, Labour’s own research in
the run-up to the 1983 election described the party as
‘implausible as an alternative government’. So dismal was
Labour’s performance in 1983, when its vote share 
slumped to 27.6 per cent, that the party faced the real
prospect of being eclipsed as the official opposition by the
SDP-Liberal Alliance.
Friends and enemies alike spoke of Foot’s party as
being in terminal decline, racked by dissent and incapable 
of adjusting to the realities of Thatcher’s enterprise culture.
In the event, rumours of Labour’s death were exaggerated.
Under Foot’s successor Neil Kinnock, a partial recovery 
took place, and by the time of the 1987 election the 
Alliance tide had receded; Labour came in a clear — if 
distant — second place. Kinnock’s party was at least still in
business, but the scars of the early 1980s took a long time 
to heal. Kinnock never reaped the reward of his endeavours
and eighteen years in opposition only came to an end 
when Tony Blair’s New Labour project held sway at the 
1997 election.
Labour’s history thus shows that while maintaining
unity is not a sufficient condition of regaining power, it is a
necessary one. As the party faces up to the possibility of
defeat on a scale even greater than in1979 and 1983, some
semblance of common purpose must be maintained if
Labour is to have any chance of avoiding the certainty of
another long spell out of power. Although ideological
divisions appear less acute than in the past, new fault 
lines might be provoked by the prospect and reality of
electoral annihilation. In the meantime, the difficulties of
preserving unity among various groups in the party are
16
staring into the abyss
compounded by the crisis facing Gordon Brown’s leadership;
as at all stages in Labour’s history, the standing of the leader
plays a crucial role in setting the tone of the party’s public-
facing image.
While the need for unity remains imperative, there are
more equivocal answers to the question of whether it’s
beneficial to ditch or stick with the chosen leader. In the
aftermath of losing power in 1951 Attlee remained in place,
his standing high as the architect of major welfare reforms,
but he lost the following election in 1955. Wilson too stayed
on, despite much internal criticism of his 1970 defeat, yet
managed to stage a successful comeback four years later. In
Callaghan’s case, the departure of the leader a year after
Thatcher’s victory saw the party’s plight get worse before it
got better.
What Labour does not have is a tradition (accepting
here that Wilson in 1976 and Blair in 2007 went at moments
of their own choosing) of forcing out serving prime
ministers. For insights pertinent in this regard to the position
of Gordon Brown, one has to turn to the experiences of the
Conservative party. In two of the three cases where
incumbent Tory premiers have been ousted since the war —
Eden, Macmillan and Thatcher (though the first two
departed partly on medical grounds) — their replacements
managed to revive government fortunes sufficiently to win
the general election that followed, in 1959 and 1992. In the
third case, Sir Alec Douglas-Home failed to pull off the 
same trick, but it’s often overlooked how close he came,
losing by only a tiny margin as Labour squeaked home 
in 1964.
There is therefore some historical evidence to suggest
a change of guard at No. 10 Downing Street between
elections can improve a party’s fortunes in the short term,
especially if the new premier appears to mark a fresh start
and presents a different persona to the outgoing leader.
Macmillan’s unflappability when he took over contrasted
with the volatility of Eden; Major’s diffidence was initially
praised as a departure from Thatcher’s stridency. But history
provides no guarantees. Labour has already ‘swapped
horses’ once during the present parliament, and the removal
of Gordon Brown would mark entry into uncharted waters.
Aside from the potential impact on party unity, the electoral
effects remain difficult to estimate. An untried leader could
well find that damage limitation — winning anything more
than the 1983 post-war low of 209 parliamentary seats — is
the best that can be achieved at the 2009/10 election. In the
present febrile mood, voters might simply take the view that
17
staring into the abyss
to lose one prime minister in the lifetime of a parliament is
unfortunate; to lose two is extremely careless.
Kevin Jefferys is professor of contemporary history at
Plymouth University and author of Finest & Darkest Hours
and Politics and the People.
Note
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staring into the abyss
1 Dalton H in Pimlott B (Ed), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-40,
1945-60 (1986)
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return to society
Jon Cruddas MP and Jonathan Rutherford
The Labour government faces the abyss. The Conservative
party cannot break from the discredited orthodoxies of its
past. It has failed to win people’s trust and can only hope for
an election victory on a minority of the vote. Bereft of a
credible economic strategy it will divide the country. The
politics of both parties now belong to the past, not to the
future. As Gramsci said, ‘the crisis consists precisely in the
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.’1 The
MPs expenses scandal, the constitutional crisis and the
profiteering of the banking oligarchy, are all morbid
symptoms of this interregnum. We do not know what the
next election will bring nor can we predict the fate of the
Labour party. The task now is to begin building a
progressive left movement that unlike New Labour will
break with the legacy of Thatcherism and establish a new
hegemony.
The era of excess
Thatcherism was the political response to Britain’s failing
industrial economy. It broke the power of organised labour,
deregulated and restructured the economy, and opened it
up to global market forces. New information and
communications technologies began to revolutionise the
generation, processing and transmission of information.
Radical innovations, backed by financial capital penetrated
the old order and began to modernise the whole productive
structure. A liberal market hegemony was established as
Britain entered a new phase of capitalist development.
The social order was transformed. In the name of a
property owning democracy, the Conservatives aligned the
economic interests of individuals with the profit-seeking of
financialised capitalism. It was a new kind of popular
compact between the market and the individual. In a low
wage, low skill economy, growth was driven by consumerism
and sustained by cheap credit. The housing market turned
homes into assets for leveraging ever-increasing levels of
borrowing. The lives of millions were integrated into the
financial markets as their savings, pensions and personal and
mortgage-backed debt were utilised for profit by the
financial industries. A similar compact between the business
elite and shareholder value created a tiny super rich elite
and became the unquestioned business model of the era.
It was a form of capital accumulation that
commodified society and engineered a massive transfer of
wealth to the rich. The institutions which had once given
people access to political ideas and activities, such as trade
unions, churches and political parties, experienced steep
membership-decline. The civic cultures of democracy were
increasingly subordinate to a winner takes all culture of
capitalism. The nation state, which took responsibility for the
welfare of its citizens, was transformed into a market state
that promised them instead economic opportunity. In this
climate a business oligarchy accrued a dangerous amount of
power and captured the political class. Growing inequalities
and the erosion of civic culture opened a cultural and
economic gulf between the elites and the mainstream
working-class population.
The gulf widened as economic modernisation
restructured the class system around the new kinds of
production and consumption. De-industrialisation has
undermined the income base of the working class and 
left large sections of the population living and working as 
if they are a reserve army of labour. Millions are now
economically inactive, or work in casualised and temporary
jobs, or are threatened with the loss of their job. Traditional
working class cultures which once offered a defence 
against exploitation and protection from social isolation
have been destroyed. This cultural destruction now
threatens the existence of the Labour party itself as the
institutions which once supported it disappear or lose 
their social vitality.
The collapse of this economic order and its governing
ideology has been precipitous. Its toxic culture has brought
down the authority of Parliament. The financial boom
created the false prosperity of a housing bubble and
unsustainable levels of private debt. The market compact
that underpinned its social order no longer commands
popular confidence. Neoliberal modernisation has created
unaccountable monopolies of capital and a centralising,
micromanaging and increasingly authoritarian state. Its
enterprise culture, flexible labour market, and marketised
welfare reform have all helped to generate insecurity,
anxiety and isolation. In public services, kindness, care and
generosity are out of keeping with the dominant market
culture. The chronic housing shortage is a national scandal.
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Unemployment is growing and areas of our country
devastated in the 1980s are now sinking again in the
recession. The social welfare contract that once gave some
protection in times of adversity is in tatters.
To make matters worse, the future is full of threats
and challenges. A revolution in human longevity is
transforming society and leading to an explosion in the
burden of care. The value of pension funds has been
destroyed by the market. There is food and water insecurity,
and oil production will peak sometime within the decade.
Looming over all these is the threat of global warming. For
the great majority of people there are no individual market
solutions to the problems we face.
This should be the moment of the left, but it too is
trapped in the same interregnum. It lacks a coherent
identity, is organisationally and numerically weak, and is
unclear about its values. It has no story that defines what it
stands for. It is telling that during the last three decades of
resurgent capitalism, social democracy in Britain has failed
to produce a significant theoretical work to replace Anthony
Crosland’s The Future of Socialism. Crosland’s revisionist
answer to Marxism, however flawed, at one time provided an
intellectual cornerstone for the centre left. Crosland was
always out there on the horizon, keeping alive the language
of class, capitalism and equality. He is no longer there. The
self-inflicted crisis of capitalism is serving only to highlight
the weakness of the social democratic and liberal left.
We need a politics of social life. We must return to
first principles and address the big questions of how we live
as well as how we create wealth. What kind of society do we
want to live in? What kind of economy will sustain it? None
of the mainstream political parties ask these questions. Nor
do they have the cultures or language to address them with
any meaning. Our political future cannot be bound by
political institutions that remain unchanged from previous
eras. Roberto Unger argues that the political systems we
build make us who we are. ‘They however are finite, and we
are not. There is always more in us, more capability of
insight, of production, of emotion, of association, than there
is in them’. We are, he says, ‘context-transcending spirits’.2
Now is the time for context transformation.
We need a philosophy of the individual in society and
a political culture that values the social goods that give
security, meaning and value to people: home, family,
friendships, good work, locality, and imaginary communities
of belonging. These were the concerns of the nineteenth
century debates between social liberals and ethical socialists
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which created the modern spirit of the left. We need to re-
invent a plural and ethical socialism rooted in the ordinary
life of the individual producing and relating in society. The
central value of this socialism alongside liberty is equality,
because, as the social liberal Leonard Hobhouse wrote, ‘it
stands for the truth that there is a common humanity deeper
than all our superficial distinctions’. The philosopher Charles
Taylor echoes this belief in his argument that the democratic
search for self-realisation lies deep in our culture. It involves
the right of everyone to achieve their own unique way of
being human. It is about mutualism not selfish individualism.
To dispute this right in others is to fail to live within its own
terms: ‘your freedom is equal to my freedom’. 
The progressive future belongs to a politics which can
achieve a balance between individual self-realisation and
social solidarity. It will be a politics of alliances between old
and new political actors and one that makes common
ground out of our cultural differences. Despite the
disillusionment with political parties, there is an
extraordinary level of political, cultural and community
activism in our society. Politics has become more
individualised, ethical and rooted in a diversity of beliefs and
lifestyles. This is stimulating a search for new kinds of
democratic political structures and cultures, which can re-
connect institutions of political power with social
movements and political constituencies. Networks and
databases, facilitated by the web, are of growing importance
in campaigning, bringing political power to account and
mobilising popular opinion. But political parties also remain
an essential part of our democracy. They provide
institutional continuity, while networks are often transient.
There is much to be gained by synergies between the two.
For this to happen, parties will need to allow their own
cultures and organisations to be opened up and
democratised in the process.
The new forms of politics are being shaped by the
production aesthetic of the information and
telecommunications economy. In the decade ahead the new
technologies will continue to transform the economy,
creating a diversity of economic structures, business models
and forms of ownership. The effervescent quality of wealth
creation will require diversity, flexibility and complexity. A
new politics must re-embed markets in society and create
strong social foundations for ecologically sustainable wealth
creation. Generous welfare support, employment rights,
access to education, decent pay and social insurance will
improve productivity and give workers confidence to
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change, learn and develop. The decades long transfer of
wealth and power from labour to capital has to be reversed
and capitalism made accountable to workers and citizens
through regulation and economic democracy. Climate
change, peak oil and the need for energy and food security
demand large scale economic transformations that require
an active, interventionist style of government. We will need
to build a civic state that is democratised, decentralised and
networked and which is able to both assert the national
interest in new structures of global economic governance
and also be accountable and responsive to individual
citizens and small businesses.
In the current political turmoil, the political fault-lines
of a new era are taking shape. On one side are those who
continue to believe that the market and individual choice are
the most effective means of maximising individual freedom.
On the other side are those who believe that individual
freedom is based in social relationships and the democracy
of public action. This fault-line cuts across party lines and
divides them from within: Thatcherites versus
compassionate Conservatives and red Toryism; market
Liberal Democrats versus social Liberal Democrats;
neoliberal New Labour versus social democratic Labour. The
contest between these politics will shape the paradigm of
the post-crash era.
In the period before the next election the Labour party
and the wider left need to secure the social gains of the last
decade and start the groundwork for a new politics. Local
government ‘place-shielding’ can protect vulnerable local
communities from both recession and from future
Conservative attack. The minimum wage and benefits must
be increased and index linked. Constitutional and electoral
reform requires an alliance with the Liberal Democrats so
let’s make one — socialists and social liberals hold much in
common. We need to know which banks are insolvent and
bring them into public ownership, strip out the toxic assets
and use them for economic recovery and development.
There is time to shut down tax havens. Let’s start making the
case for a social Europe and call for a referendum on
Britain’s membership. It’s time to confront the issue. A
national debate will expose the reactionary xenophobia of
the right. Let’s build relationships with European progressive
parties and social movements, and create a new
internationalism for global justice. The future is about
alliances, values and a return to society. Let’s start putting
down the foundations.
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Jon Cruddas is MP for Dagenham. Jonathan Rutherford is
editor of Soundings and Professor of Cultural Studies at
Middlesex University. They are co-editors of The Crash: A
view from the left.
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choose social-ism
Neal Lawson
As I write the Labour party is in the eye of the biggest storm
that has ever engulfed it. A big chunk of the party want to
junk the leader, some are still supportive and many are
unsure.
Let’s be clear. Gordon Brown has been the most
enormous disappointment as leader. Even on the economy it
was little more than a year ago that he was lauding the city
bankers for their brilliance and was willing to apply the
‘lessons of their success’ to the rest of the economy. Both
the substance and style of his leadership are deeply flawed.
But for a plot to unseat him to succeed it needs what
it says in the title: a plot, a story about what is wrong and
what needs to be put right. In the absence of this we have a
rather hopeful ‘anything is better than this’ leap of faith to
some unknown future leader with an unknown policy
agenda. Again, at the time of writing it is no surprise that
thus far Brown has remained seated.
But the truth is that some of the plotters do have a
plot; one that reveals a deep schism at the heart of Labour.
It is between those that want the New Labour revolution to
be sustained and deepened and those that want to break
with past and have a fundamentally different vision of the
good society. Gordon Brown’s problem is not really that he
doesn’t communicate well or smiles at the wrong moment —
it’s that he promised a break with Blairism and never
delivered on it. Unless and until Labour decides whether it is
going to Blairite or post-Blairite then its future will remain as
bleak as it feels right now.
The core of the so far non-debate is about how we
make change and what is the mechanical and moral building
block for a good society. The New Labour or Blairite belief is
that everything starts with the individual. It is up to us to
think and act based on our own view of our own best
interest. The role of the state is to empower us as individuals
to spend and demand. This could of course lead to
collective action, but that’s only if individuals decide what it
is they want.
This I think is broadly what James Purnell believes in.
It’s just a shame he didn’t say so — if he had it would have
helped spark the debate we need to have. I think we will be
hearing more from James and others on the development of
such a politics.
It shares in passing some of the politics of the
democratic left as represented by Compass, in that it has a
suspicion about the role of the bureaucratic state — both in
the sense that the state can crowd out autonomous activity
and the unintended consequences of the lumbering central
machine. Command and control politics was tried and it
failed. And for good reason.
But in rejecting the bureaucratic state the Blairites
embrace the market state and in so doing plump for a
politics which is in essence about individual-ism and not
about social-ism. Of course there are cases for individualised
budgets for some care treatments. But the building block
for social, economic and political change cannot be the
individual. It has to be social.
The story of the last thirty years has been the transfer
of risk from the collective, the social and the community to
the individual. The crisis of profitability of capitalism created
the condition in which privatisation and the commoditisation
of the public realm were necessary for the survival of capital.
It meant not only that we had to buy more to stave off
uncertainty and risk but that collectively our bargaining
hand was severely weakened. In the absence of a
modernising left alternative and alongside the sugar coated
pill of turbo-consumption it led to a golden age of
individualism. But all that has unravelled; the debt, the
insecurity and uncertainty are palpable. Extending and
deepening that counter-revolution offers little hope. It is one
reason why the small state agenda of David Cameron cannot
fly. There are no individual solutions to global problems.
Instead the challenge is to find new and better ways to
be social. The benefits are both instrumental — we can do
more together than we can ever achieve alone — and
intrinsic — we gain emotional and wellbeing benefits by
working together with others. The historic problem for the
left is that its approach was bureaucratic rather than
democratic in its approach. It trusted the machine not the
people. The challenge today is to work out at every level not
just how the state can be democratised, to put the people in
control of it, but how civil society and the economy can be
democratised too.
Of course there will be a role for markets, for
individuals, for some command and control and for
professionals. We need a rich mix of means to shape a
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complex and contradictory world. But the theme of the
social and therefore the democratic must run throughout
the new plot of the left.
Social-ism should be defined as the ability of people
to exert the maximum control over their lives. For this,
people have to be more equal; to have the resources to live
a free life. But they must also act in concert with other — as
citizens shaping the big things in their life and not just as
consumers buying the small things that change too little.
Of course the Blairites will disagree because they 
have a different vision of the good society, starting as they
do with the individual and not the social. Such difference
should be openly and constructively debated. Through
debate we will learn and adapt; find tangents on which we
can agree and understand where we don’t. Of course the
Blairites may win the debate and change Labour irrevocably
to a party based on individualism. Perhaps they already 
have — if so it is a sad day for the left. Other parties
represent in different shades the politics of individualism —
only Labour offers the hope of a world based on the social
and therefore democracy.
Labour should now use the time until the next election
to do everything it feasibly can to put in place the building
blocks of solidarity and democracy. First, it should protect
the people who stand to suffer most if the Tories win. This
would include ideas like index-linking the minimum wage
and benefit payments to ensure George Osborne doesn’t
allow them to whither on the vine by not updating them. It
should encourage a wide public debate about the need for
dependable public services, to end child poverty and the fair
taxes necessary to pay for both.
Second, it must radically reform our democracy.
Democracy and social-ism are two sides of the same coin.
Key here is the call for a binding referendum on change to a
more proportional voting system, which David Cameron is
implacably opposed to. This represents a perfect dividing
line, between Labour who trust the people to decide and the
Tories, who don’t.
Third, it should rebuild the institutions in which social
democracy can thrive in the future: the party itself, the
unions, local government and other elements of civil society
in which the values of democracy, equality, and sustainability
can take root. Places in which the public trumps the private,
with the citizens the lone consumer.
But this cannot just come from the top. The whole
party should be engaged. The democratic and economic
crises are without precedent. We are in unchartered waters.
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The party leadership should instigate a discussion among
the membership, the unions, affiliated societies and the
Parliamentary Labour Party to draft a short restatement of
Labour values and policy intent up to the next election. This
statement could be put online for everyone to comment on.
It would be the vehicle through which the battle of ideas
between those who want a bureaucratic state, a market
state or a democratic state could be openly and honestly
played out. It would be sent to every party member for their
endorsement. Unless it signalled a change of direction it
would garner little support. This process would be
concluded by the end of July and the Party Conference used
to establish a plan of implementation.
This debate, however, is not just about Labour and the
answer to how to achieve the good society cannot be
confined to one party — far from it. One of the reasons for
New Labour’s failures in office is that it refused to work with
others — other parties and movements. It did not embed its
project in civil society and was therefore always prey to the
whims of a few swing voters in a few swing seats as well as
the financial demands of the city and media moguls. Gordon
Brown once said he wanted to build a progressive
consensus. There has never been a better time to do it. But
it will come from below not on high and it will be based not
on the individual but the social.
Neal Lawson is Chair of Compass and author of All
Consuming to be published by Penguin in June.
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rebuild the middle
Phillip Blond
Where now for Labour? Strictly speaking the immediate
future is one of electoral oblivion. But what type of
extinction is it? Could we be looking at the removal of the
Labour party from the determining political landscape of
Britain? At the moment the standard conversation is about
the length of time Labour will spend out of power, ranging
between two terms and a generation. But the outcome
could be more even more extreme. To recover the council
seats it has lost from its high point will, if the experience of
the Conservatives from their nadir in the 1980s is anything
to go by, take at least a quarter of a century. Moreover, the
almost complete erasure of Labour councilors from much of
southern England denies the party any constituency or
activist bedrock in huge swathes of the South and no real
possibility therefore of ever electing a Labour MP again.
Labour has just endured its worst council results since
local government re-organisation in 1974. It now controls no
shire or county councils in England at all, and it has come
third in the popular national vote behind the Liberal
Democrats. An even more frightening future was outlined in
sharp relief by the European elections, which were the worst
performance in this poll for Labour since the vote was
introduced. It lost the national vote in Wales for the first
time since 1918, and in touching less than 16 per cent of the
national vote it is the worst electoral share since 1910 and
presages an unthinkable elimination of the Labour party
from the body politic. In the Labour heartlands of Wales and
Scotland voters are abandoning the party of Bevan and
Macdonald in droves, and in England the abandoned,
diffident and angry poor are ripe for capture by an
alternative progressive politics.
No party is guaranteed a permanent political future,
and if the Liberal Democrats can position themselves as the
defenders of the waged working class (which New Labour
has so evidently abandoned) and the indentured and
insecure middle class (which new Labour did so much too
create) as well as the advocates of the progressive and
affluent, then the Labour Party could indeed be consigned
to third party irrelevance. However, the Liberal Democrats
have shown no such imaginative triangulation so the
permanent relegation of Labour looks as yet an unlikely but
not an unthinkable future outcome. Alternatively, and this is
the more likely scenario given the relatively poor
performance of the Liberal Democrats, both Labour and the
Liberal Democrats could become in effect regional parties,
with Labour governing only its shrinking welfare bastions in
Britain’s inner cities and the Liberals holding on to their
South Western enclave and scattered university towns.
While all the while a resurgent conservatism, if it extends its
appeal across the political spectrum, can dictate and shape
the centre ground of a new politics.
How did it all come to this? We know the short-term
reasons: the economic crisis, the expenses scandal and the
psychological limits and dictatorial habits of Gordon Brown.
But these causes alone, even if one reaches back and
includes the war in Iraq, are insufficient explanations of this
current precipitate collapse. To my mind, and I take a longer
view, we have seen the final working out via its full
expression in New Labour of the legacy of the post-war left:
the bastard union of state authoritarianism and personal left
libertarianism. And it is this invidious issue that is now being
wholly and rightly repudiated.
As I have argued elsewhere — the legacy of central
state absolutism and subjective atomisation is a liberal
bequest that was taken up enthusiastically and with
disastrous consequence by the post-war left. The British left
in the middle of the 19th century was associative, civil,
reciprocal and religious. That this has now been replaced by
atomised personal autonomy, control of and by the state,
unilateral rights assertion and enforced secularity is a
historical rupture that demands a full and sincere historical
analysis, one which must be conducted elsewhere.
In brief, liberalism’s true radical basis extends back to
Rousseau whose notion of contract was founded above all
on a repudiation of society. For Rousseau, emergence into
society is the first act of imprisonment, for though we are
free we are everywhere in chains. Like all liberals Rousseau
conceived individuals as a category prior to and separate
from any social formation — indeed society is itself only
created when these raw and savage wills are drawn out of a
state of nature by the social contract. The trouble is that
each person’s individuality must find its full expression in the
society it now constitutes, otherwise freedom will be
replaced once more by bondage. Thus the general will
becomes the primary way for the will of each individual to
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be reconciled with the will of others. Since this scenario of
reconciliation is in essence irreconcilable, the conflict
experienced in the state of nature is simply repeated in
society with ever greater and more damaging effect. In the
political context, the more individualist each person
becomes, the more power and control the state must accrue
in order to control the situation. So the liberal war of all
against all requires an ever more illiberal state to control and
protect a society so tragically and illegitimately conceived.
The post war history of the Labour party mirrors
almost exactly this debilitating tension. British society has
been progressively and aggressively pulverised by the
assertions of state authoritarianism and individualist
libertarianism. The 1945 settlement, which achieved so
much, also damaged and ultimately undermined a great deal
more. The post-war socialist state nationalised society and
rendered superfluous all of its intermediate and civic
structures. Institutions and the associative patterns of
behaviour that they encouraged were the creation and
possession of an empowered working class, but they were
rendered redundant by the new managerial welfare state. As
JB Priestly put it in 1949 ‘the area of our lives under our own
control is shrinking rapidly’ and that ‘politicians and senior
civil servants are beginning to decide how the rest of us
shall live.’1
This vertical state produced a new, disassociative
citizenry. Isolated and alone, an increasingly fragmented
working class was vulnerable to the next version of the
liberal legacy — possessive individualism. The Bloomsbury
group in the 1920s tried an earlier formation of the liberal
deconstruction of common values and binding codes — but
the strong associative bonds of the pre-war middle and
working class meant that this social nihilism never passed
fully into British culture. However the mass consumption and
mindless libertarianism of the late 1960s middle class finally
did for the poor. When the decadent individualism of
sectional interests and assertive rights had finally destroyed
the society of the poor by promising it liberation from family,
responsibility and human relationships, the introduction of
liberalism into the labour movement had reached its logical
conclusion: socialists had finally abandoned society.
In short it is because this liberal legacy that has finally
been recognised and repudiated that voters are abandoning
Labour. Ordinary citizens want society back; they want
control of their own lives and the ability to form
communities with others. They want to create a civic
‘middle’ that gives them back their society. The left, if it
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wants to regain the progressive agenda, must firstly come to
terms with its own legacy. It must repudiate the easy cultural
relativism of the liberal middle class and the state
authoritarianism used to control the working class. Instead it
must realise the new politics and the coming future.
And what is this new politics? Well, it is the creation of
a new compact around intermediate associations and civic
institutions. It is a limiting of the centralising state and the
monopoly market in favour of an empowered populace and
a radical decentralisation and pluralisation of power,
property and purpose. But such a renewal can only take
place around a cultural recognition of the permanent things.
Unless Labour embraces a new conservatism that sees
beyond culture and change to a persistent good which can
be known, recognised and distributed, its innate cultural
relativism will have it spiralling off into irrelevance.
Phillip Blond is Director of the Progressive Conservatism
Project at Demos.
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think tradition
Alan Finlayson
If Labour is to remain a significant force in British politics
then its leadership and its grassroots members need to
understand two things. The first is the extent of the
disrepute into which the party has fallen; the second is the
damage caused by the party’s abandonment of its own
social-democratic tradition.
Those closely involved with Labour at local or 
national level may still imagine it to be the party of equality,
the rights of ordinary people and community. But 
everybody else sees nothing of the kind. They see a party
lacking such principles, whose leaders like to show off next
to celebrities (that they then appoint to the House of Lords),
vie with each other for power rather than exercise it and
manage property portfolios paid for out of the public purse.
For the average twenty-year old (such as those I teach)
Labour is the party of war, commercialisation and self-
interest. In this respect at least the party has been very
successfully re-branded.
Labour people will disagree with this perception. But
they must acknowledge it and thus the gulf between how
they see their party and how it is seen and experienced by
everyone else. Furthermore, they must appreciate that the
fault does not lie solely with an unfair press or inattentive
citizens and that it will not be remedied by finding the right
face, the correct form of words or a better ‘narrative’.
Ordinary people see in Labour a party that has abandoned
much of its ethical and intellectual tradition and fallen into
confusion, adrift without a political or ethical compass. And
they see this because it is true.
Social democratic parties across Europe in the
twentieth-century had two fundamental purposes. The first
of these was to represent politically the labour movement
and to further the interests of the working class. The British
Labour party did this through incorporating trade unions
into policy-making, striving for full employment and
providing universal public services. The second task was to
limit the corrosive force of commodification. The Labour
party sustained and fostered institutions and spaces within
society independent of the utilitarian values and commercial
imperatives of the market. If the Tory party, classically, drew
its supporters from various kinds of commercial interest,
then Labour existed for those opposed not to the market as
such but to its intrusion into areas understood to be of value
but without price.
British social democracy — contrary to the story we
are often told — was immensely successful. But the very
social changes it engendered altered the class, occupational
and cultural patterns of the UK, initiated some ‘class de-
alignment’ in voting and changed the sorts of problems
experienced by the poorest. None of this vitiated the need
for political representation of working people. But the
change was sufficient to decrease Labour’s political
constituency (although this was exaggerated by those with
a political interest in so doing). Social and economic
transformations (involving family life, gender relations,
workplace technologies and so on) required the British left
and Labour movement to think afresh and to create new
kinds of political interest to represent.
But what the Labour party, as New Labour, actually
did was in retrospect extraordinary. Its leaders decided not
only that there was never any real conflict between
employers and employees but also embraced
commercialisation as a positive value. Its leaders and
advisers came to believe that market competition
necessarily induces responsibility in producers or providers
and generates responsiveness to demand. They confused
consumer choice with democratic freedom and introduced
rules and regulations to make public services more like
private ones. In many cases they directly opened up the
former to the latter at prices far below market-value which,
when you think about it, is pretty ironic.
The more that Labour abandoned its opposition to
total commodification, the more its support has dwindled.
British culture needs a party that emphasises our acquisitive
and commercial aspect but it also needs a countervailing
force emphasising our local and communal variety, an
appreciation of the quirkily unmarketable and a suspicion of
excess. In abandoning this ground the Labour party ceded
the reasons for its existence and until recently the absence
of any replacement has enabled it to survive. But, as the
results of the European elections indicate, voters in search
of seeming fidelity to ordinary ways of life, a sense of
security and community, and a rejection of gross
consumerism are scattering in all directions and heading to
where they imagine (usually wrongly) they might find these
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things: Greens, UKIP, BNP and some to Cameron’s red, green
and blue Tories.
Too many British citizens experience the pain of a
world too quickly eroded by the flow of capital, undermining
a sense of place and belonging, disorienting life and the
values that animate it. The last fifteen years have seen a
change in what Raymond Williams called ‘the structure of
feeling’ in Britain. Thatcherism left us with a culture skewed
too far towards competitive individualism and lacking in
respect for the communal. New Labour pushed this further,
transferring more risk from the collective to the individual
and telling us to look out for ourselves, to purchase our own
pensions and healthcare rather than support anybody else’s,
and to invest in our houses not as homes but as assets. We
are left with a culture of nervously aggressive individualism
celebrated by a popular media filled with all kinds of bullying
and humiliation. Compass long ago christened this the
‘social recession’. Cameron’s Tories now call it ‘the broken
society’. Labour people sometimes feel forced to refute the
existence of both but the truth is that everyone knows
exactly what is meant. In a society where commerce is the
only source of value, you are what you own and you had
better get more however you can: steal it at knife-point;
evade your taxes; artificially inflate your share price; or
fiddle your expenses and flip your house.
Labour has not merely departed from the legacy of
European social democracy. It has sought actively to forget
it. It has attacked public sector workers, the ‘forces of
conservatism’ that Blair said had left ‘scars’ on his back. With
the intention of promoting aspiration it has, in curricular
reforms at both school and university level, intensified
insistence on the virtue of the lone entrepreneur rather than
that of the servant of the public good. Today we even
promote service in the armed forces not because of the
virtue of defending your country or saving innocent lives 
but because of the transferable employability skills it will
give you.
Labour has cut itself off from itself. Its recent leaders
seem ignorant of what the social democratic tradition
teaches us about ethics and politics. Conservatives treat
theirs as a living tradition. But Labour people have learned
to be scared of theirs, thinking it a dead-weight rather than
a springboard. A generation has entered the Labour party
and been inculcated into a marketing strategy rather than an
ethics and a world view. This is disastrous. Thought properly,
traditions do not confine but orient. They don’t answer all
our questions but help us to ask the right ones. In cultivating
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ignorance and hostility to its own ideological tradition,
Labour, far from renewing itself, has starved itself. It may
have passed through a phase where it looked leaner and
more refreshed than before, but this was only one stage in
the process of wasting away. A tradition takes centuries to
build up and only one generation to wipe out.
The main symptom of this is that many Labour
leaders, in their writings, speeches and interviews, seem to
lack a concept of power — of the forms it takes, of who has
it and the ways it might be exercised or directed. They seem
to think that passing a law or a regulation is in itself
sufficient to bring about change and when it hasn’t worked
they have given up like easily bored children or invented a
new law, another regulation. They have ‘devolved’ power to
the consumer as if the buyer-seller relation exists in a
vacuum and is always one of equality. But the intellectual
tradition of social democracy teaches one to recognise the
complex interactions between forms of power, and in
particular to see how the capitalist market is driven to
expand into and to colonise social life in the search for
profitable returns. It certainly has dynamism and is
something without which a society cannot flourish. But its
energy needs to be contained and sometimes directed. Left
to itself it gets out of control, crushes what is in its path and
then, when it is exhausted, crashes. New Labour thought
such an analysis old-fashioned. It fed the market,
encouraged debt, artificially inflated house prices and
encouraged us all to be investors. When the market failed it
decided the invisible hand was insufficient and that the
greed of bankers should be paid for by tax-payers. Incapable
of understanding market and economic power, New Labour
was ruthlessly played by those who understand competition
perfectly.
An ethic of public service and awareness of a common
good persists in British political life. It is there in small local
pressure or support groups, charitable and religious
community groups. It is there too in the Social Forum, NGOs
and in parts of the activist and protest movements. Such
groups will not now be co-opted by Labour. Everyone knows
that a successful political campaign does not need to be
attached to a political party. All you need is conviction, the
internet and right on your side (perhaps also Joanna
Lumley). In any case, if you are concerned about climate
change or civil rights why would you seek the help of the
party that wants to build roads and airports, disregards
habeas corpus and colludes in torture?
Labour seems always to be worrying about its own
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renewal. But usually this means thinking about how to
change others so that they will see Labour as it sees itself
rather than actually looking in the mirror. The electorate has
now held that mirror before the party and it must
acknowledge the truth of what it finds there. The first thing
Labour MPs and their supporters must now do is accept that
it is over for them. They will lose the next election. Once
they accept this they will be able to concentrate on finishing
their time in office with dignity.
In their final six to twelve months the Labour
government must accept that the financial services sector,
important though it is, imposes costs on the British
economy by distorting appearances and inducing short-
termism over proper investment. The way to deal with this is
to tax transactions partly as a disincentive to too hasty a
trade but also to build up the funds that will pay for the
damage tax payers did not do. In addition they should pass
laws requiring fuller disclosure in private company accounts.
Freedom of information has enabled citizens to regulate
their corrupt politicians. It will also enable them to regulate
the corporations. Our national economy is in need of
diversification and encouragement for those who make
things rather than those who trade in imaginary ones.
Labour should initiate a massive investment programme into
biotechnology and green energy and the creation of an
infrastructure for alternative fuel systems. And before it
leaves office it should index link the minimum wage and
prepare for two referenda: one on the voting system and
one on the House of Lords. None of this will win Labour the
next election. But Cameron has not yet secured a coherent
coalition to sustain himself in office and policies such as
these will force the Tories to actively overturn pro-social,
pro-environmental policies. More importantly, they are the
right thing to do.
The results in Scotland and Wales are clear
manifestations of an underlying historical transformation in
British politics. Labour should encourage its members to
abandon tribal prejudice and open discussions with the
nationalist parties and with the Green party as to how to co-
operate in the event of a hostile Tory government keen to
claw back central powers and to make a populist appeal to
Englishness (for this will surely come). It should also
recommend that branch parties halve their number of
meetings and instead all participate in volunteer activity
(litter clearing, advocacy work for refugees, painting schools
and so on). The Cabinet — as many already have — should
then announce that they have no intention of standing for
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office again. Freed from the vain hope of re-election they
can step away from their ministerial offices and do what
they should have done long ago: get out and speak with
every church, school, union branch, college or charitable
association that will invite them. They should apologise and
then listen to whatever it is people have to say while re-
learning what it is to make an argument for a belief and to
really mean it.
Such measures will not win Labour power but they will
begin to put it back in touch with itself and with its country.
And that is also why Labour needs to learn its ideology
again — to remember why working people (and those now
put out of work) need representation and why commod-
ification needs to be kept contained; to re-learn what power
is in a capitalist democracy such as ours, who has it and who
does not and with what effects on social and cultural life.
Only when Labour remembers and truly understands where
it came from will it be able to work out where it is supposed
to be going.
Alan Finlayson is Reader in Politics and International
Relations at Swansea University.
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the common good
Maurice Glasman
The reality of Labour’s distress needs no rehearsal. What
confronts Labour now is pain and rejection. The sources of
its suffering are to be found in the intensity of its
commitment to free market economics and a type of
welfare state which have not only failed to deliver but have
actively undermined the integrity of society. In its pursuit of
liquidity it has eroded solidarity. In its pursuit of fairness it
has centralised power. This is not a trivial matter. The
strengthening of both the free market and the welfare 
state is a good working definition of the political career 
of Gordon Brown, and of New Labour. With the
unprecedented challenge to the assumptions of both
welfare and market economics there is now an
uncomprehending void at the centre of Labour thinking on
policy and politics.
What is at stake now is whether Labour has the
resources to renew itself as a potent force in British society
or whether its present condition is indeed progressive. It is
the argument of this essay that Labour has invested heavily
not just in a set of bankrupt banks but bankrupt ideas. It
needs to disentangle from both so that it can draw upon
neglected resources within the Labour tradition that can
better explain its current predicament, as well as providing a
credible escape route and orientation for renewal.
Let us begin with the welfare state. The utilitarian
approach adopted by Labour means that power is exercised
by experts who consider traditional institutions, work-
practices and communities as impediments to justice,
efficiency and truth. The method itself turns people into
powerless units of administration and no good can come of
it. Its enforcement leads to the erosion and co-option of the
institutions necessary to generate the virtuous and skilful
people required to build a good society. The state can
redistribute wealth but it has proved incapable of
redistributing power.
This in itself is not new. The problem for socialism has
always been how to stop the state nationalising society. New
Labour’s unique contribution to political practice is a
combination of this type of state collectivism with a robust
market economics. This is the idea that capitalism in the
form it takes in financial markets is the most efficient means
of distributing resources, pursuing prosperity and protecting
liberty. The withdrawal of Labour as a force within the
economy — confining itself to spending the money
generated by financial deregulation on welfare — has proved
to be decisive in determining its fate.
Labour was born in resistance to the domination of
the market and built institutions such as mutual societies,
cooperative businesses and trade unions that tried to limit
the power of money in the distribution of power. It
emphasised, in contrast, the importance of building a
politics based on relationships. The selling of things that are
not produced for sale and are not easily replaceable such as
school playing fields or your body and its organs, is what is
known as commodification. The pressure the market exerts
to turn people and nature into things that can be bought
and sold constitutes a real threat to the status not only of
human beings as a purposeful social agent, capable of trust
and responsibility, but (as Margaret Thatcher reminded us)
of society itself. Against this the Labour movement
contested the unlimited sovereignty of capital to determine
economic relations. The organising principle of the entire
Labour movement was based on achieving the recognition
from both employers and the state of organised labour as a
partner in production and in politics. They even went so far
as to name the entire endeavour ‘Labour’.
It was its commitment to financial services as the
driving force of the British economy that put the ‘new’ into
New Labour. The scale of its dedication to this principle was
expressed in the City of London Electoral Bill of 2002. In this
the partners or managers of each firm in the Square Mile
were given a vote based on the size of their workforce for
electing representatives to the local authority. Five workers
gives you one vote, ten workers two and so on.
Unfortunately, the workforce itself has no vote. A Labour
majority of over three hundred voted through legislation
that gave the City of London workforce the same status as
slaves and cattle at the time of the American Revolution in
order to represent the exclusive power of money in the most
ancient territorial civic institution in the world whose home
is, of all places, the Guildhall. The bailout of the banks, the
biggest transfer of wealth from poor to rich since the
Norman Conquest, follows on from that. The fundamental
cause of the financial crash, as is the case with parliamentary
corruption, was the lack of any effective oversight or
the common good
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countervailing force to the sovereignty of managers which
could have challenged the decisions on the basis of shared
information and equal status.
The balance of power in corporate governance is the
primary concept here. The market ravages people and their
environment to maximise returns on investment through the
most effective exploitation of resources. That’s what it does
and it should be recognised that such a goose as this is
more likely to foul its nest than to lay a golden egg. A
genuinely prudent politics would assume this to be the case.
It has been the fundamental role of democratic politics since
Athens to domesticate it and make it serve human ends and
Labour needs to reconnect with that idea.
The problem with New Labour’s view of the market
and the state lies in their shared conception of sovereignty.
Sovereignty has two aspects. It gives the sovereign the
power to act but it also shields it from any reciprocal
relationships or accountability. Machiavelli called this type of
unilateral power potere. It is the uncontested assertion of
the power of a single will. The type of power Labour
pursued was inherently corrupting in that the capacity to act
without constraint or oversight led to the arrogance and
recklessness that have brought the City of London and
Westminster so low. The meaning of the expenses outrage is
that the dark heart of sovereignty has been revealed as
dangerous and dishonest. It is dishonest because Parliament
is, in fact, impotent and subordinate to the executive power.
Finding themselves powerless, MPs embraced the other side
of sovereignty and exerted their prerogative to conceal,
which led unsurprisingly to their recognition that they could
steal from the public, exempt from any power that could
deny them; and that is dangerous. Accountability only has
meaning if there is a countervailing power that has an
interest in holding people to it.
The alternative form of power is relational, in which
the capacity to act is generated through association with
others. The trust, skill and solidarity necessary for sustained
and effective common action means that relational politics is
the most important source of public education for by doing
it people learn the necessity of virtue. This, Machiavelli called
potenziale, or potency, referring to the potential that active
relationships possess. Potency is necessary to create life.
People lift themselves and each other out of poverty by
becoming more skilful, more connected, more experienced
and therefore, more powerful. It is something they can only
do together. Relational power in pursuit of the common
good is the key to each aspect of Labour’s renewal.
the common good
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It is also important to ask why, given the scale of its
failure, anyone should be faithful to such a tradition of
politics. Why be Labour now? The answer lies in the unique
inheritance of the Labour movement. The practices and
ideas of mutuality, reciprocity, the balance of power,
solidarity and above all, organisation, and their connection
to the economic life of society are the distinctive gifts that
the Labour movement passes down to us. Our identity itself
gives us the resources of renewal.
The English peasantry dispossessed of their land by
enclosures and the artisans dispossessed of their status by
the repeal of apprenticeship laws built an organised political
movement that generated real institutions with real power.
The Labour interest, at work and at home, became a
significant force in the firm, the locality, the city and the
nation through pursuing the common good on the basis of
organised interests. This led to a genuine transformation in
the distribution of power and wealth. In the most hostile
conditions the working poor buried each other, recognised
each-others skills and protected the integrity of family life.
The choices were hard and the politics were hard. And that
is exactly where we are. The builders and creators of the
Labour movement are our greatest teachers and we must
honour them.
The organisation London Citizens is the closest living
embodiment of this tradition. They pursue a common-good
politics based upon common action between different
institutions through the practice of community organising.
So what are self-organised people, naming their own
problems and pursuing their interests, claiming to be the
important issues and policies?
The first is the establishment of a living wage for 
every worker at £7.45 an hour. This grew out of the
experience that you could work and still not be able to 
feed your children or spend any time with them. A Living
Wage would be a direct cash improvement in the 
conditions of the poorest workers without any mediating
bureaucracy. It would place family life as a central good 
and provide an incentive to work as well as respecting 
its dignity.
The second issue is safer streets. London Citizens has
provided a framework within which faith communities,
schools, businesses and unions can confront the power of
drug dealers and gangs and contest their ownership of the
street. Would Labour be prepared to give communities
greater power over their shared public spaces? Perhaps the
most difficult challenge facing Labour is going to be the
the common good
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necessity of engaging in a common-good politics with
religious communities who have succeeded in preserving
their associational integrity when Labour has lost theirs.
Respectability has always been a far more important
concept in English politics than respect and Labour needs to
re-engage with what that means.
The third campaign concerns affordable housing, the
possibility that families can have a home with enough space
to live in. This involves a restoration of co-operatives and
land trusts which enables people to build their homes
outside the conventional property market. Wages, public
order and housing turn out to form the basis of the political
agenda after all.
Barack Obama was trained and worked as a
community organiser and has consistently recognised its
formative influence on all aspects of his politics, including
his successful campaign. The energy, the connection with
first time voters, the common good content seem like a
different world to that confronting Labour now. Hope is only
reasonable if you have the power to act effectively with
others. The Labour movement is rooted in the rules of
community organising which teach that only organised
people can change their world through building
relationships and engaging in common action. It involves
taking sides and holding power accountable to the people 
it serves. Labour should argue that in order for people to
protect the things and people that they love they must
organise themselves around the institutions they trust to
pursue a common good. Labour used to be one of those
institutions but is no more.
So, finally, what now for Labour? The politics of the
common good.
Dr Maurice Glasman is Director of the Faith and Citizenship
Programme at London Metropolitan University and the
author of Unnecessary Suffering.
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look to the town hall, 
not Whitehall
Tristram Hunt
In the midst of an ugly electoral post-mortem and very
necessary debate about constitutional propriety, Labour
must not abandon intellectual activity altogether. In less
than twelve months time, Britain faces an historic general
election which will decide whether Labour can embed 
the progressive consensus. For what this month’s poll has
also revealed is the absence of any quickening hunger for
Cameron’s Conservatives. The electoral hill he has to 
climb remains steep. Meanwhile, the Labour party needs
desperately now to show a continuing instinct for change
and a capacity to think creatively. That means drawing on
the Labour movement’s past to offer meaningful, pro-
gressive solutions to an understandably anxious Britain. 
The effective response of Gordon Brown and the
British government to the global credit-crunch over the last
year has rightly led to a renewed belief in the capacity of the
state to act as a catalyst for reform. What has prevented
recession slipping into depression and saved us thus far
from a 1930s-style retreat into protectionism and structural
unemployment is responsible and coordinated action by
treasuries across the world. After years of lazy Conservative
critique of Whitehall and town hall, suddenly the actions of
public servants are not so risible after all.
But on the left, this crisis has led too many to seek the
familiar, paternalist hand of the man in Whitehall knowing
best. As such, it has formed part of a broader reliance upon
statist remedies which has accumulated in recent years. This
itself is part of a historical trend that sees ministerial
dirigisme creep from the economic to the public sphere. 
All too quickly, in the 1940s and 1950s, the thinking of 
JM Keynes together with more aggressive economic
planners edged its way into social policy as great swathes 
of British public life fell under Whitehall’s dominion. When 
it came to the NHS, energy policy and environmental
controls, much of this centralism delivered a welcome
measure of social justice, but the traditional journey from
economic intervention to ever greater social activism by 
the state is no longer the appropriate response to the
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failings of 21st century, laissez-faire financial capitalism. 
For there is another story of Labour which has been all
too readily abandoned in the current debate. It is one which
values the capacity of the state, but does not regard an
increase in state spending as a virility symbol for socialism.
Indeed, it has its roots in a tradition which was often hostile
to the demands and depredations of the kind of Westminster
elites we currently see chasing their own tails. 
What shaped the pioneer, early 1900s Labour party
was not just trade unions and intellectuals, but also a
powerful hinterland of mutualism, associationalism and civil
society stretching back to the early 1800s. From the
Owenites to the Chartists to the Rochdale cooperators — via
the friendly societies and self-help clubs of most British
towns and cities — Labour’s political ethos was cumulatively
moulded. Here were self-governing communities teaching,
employing and mobilising themselves. This tradition of
mutualism provided vehicles for social mobility, civic pride,
political voice and even global activism on issues such as
slavery, colonial liberation and militarism. Here lay the origins
of the trade union movement and provided the training
ground for some of Britain’s most effective working-class
progressives. 
With the advent of the vote, this civic ethos continued
to guide the Labour movement in power in councils across
the country. In Manchester, Glasgow and, most successfully
of all, early 1900s London under the Progressives, left-wing
administrations married civil society with political capacity
to produce the great epoch of municipal socialism.
Experimenting, innovating and delivering social justice on a
local scale, Labour councils put the civic tradition into
action. From school meals to free transport, public health 
to parks, swimming baths to political education, art 
galleries to decent housing, the full panoply of the good 
life was delivered to the people outside the purlieu of the
central state. 
Today we are told by David Cameron’s ‘philosopher
du jour’, Phillip Blond, that the Tory party is the true home of
such local democracy and civic activism. In his new work on
‘red Toryism’, Blond urges a Burkean force of little platoons
to break the monopoly logic of the market state and allow
for a new era of ‘communitarian civic conservatism.’ In
effect, his is little more than an updated version of ‘villa
Toryism’ combined with a high Conservative nostalgia for
the thick, organic, pre-modern world. 
Phillip Blond is right to suggest that Labour has
become too close to the big government, corporate interest:
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having come to power on taxing the excess profits of the
utilities, ministers now run scared of BAA, big oil and big
pharma. But in his black and white template, Blond seems to
regard the Labour party as interested in the defence of the
central state in and of itself. What is more, he argues that
the modern Labour party has detached itself from any
remnants of its civic tradition. 
Few would argue that in 1997, after 18 years of Tory
inaction and a monstrously desiccated public sphere, a
degree of concerted state activism was not needed. In some
policy areas, New Labour went too far with its centralising
ambitions for ‘Napoleonic control’. But, at the same time, the
last ten years has witnessed a magnificent devolution of
power — from the Scottish Parliament to the Welsh
Assembly to the London Mayor and now (albeit belatedly)
further autonomy for local councils in terms of revenue-
raising powers and the much overlooked city-region status. 
Which is how it should be. In the age of the internet,
mass migration, fragmenting multi-culturalism, and a new
culture of aggressive consumer power, the old command
and control template is over. What is more, recent public
policy debacles have starkly revealed how pulling the central
levers doesn’t work. We have seen, despite over a decade of
aggressive policy responses from Whitehall which has lifted
hundreds of thousands out of absolute poverty, a continuing
inability to transform ingrained social inequality within
Britain. The traditional levers for change no longer provide
the kind of capacity building and social innovation on the
ground which shifts life chances. Only last month came
figures showing just how difficult it still proved to eliminate
pensioner poverty, child poverty and inequality (at its
highest level since 1961).1
Meanwhile, an array of high-profile educational
initiatives — from ‘Building Schools for the Future’ to the
Learning and Skills Council college building programme —
have revealed the hopeless inadequacy of Whitehall
planning. 
So this, surely, is the terrain for Labour to confront
over the coming months. Rather than letting David Cameron
get away with the notion that the Tory party — the great
arbitrary centralisers of modern British history — has any
innate concern for re-engaging civil society, Labour should
use the current disgust at big politics to revive its civic
tradition. That can mean all sorts of minor policy plans to
improve liveability — implementing the Quirk Review on
public space, abandoning the big business Barker Review on
planning, rolling back the terrible liberalisation laws on
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betting and drinking which have done so much to destroy
the British high street. 
But it also demands a New Deal with local government
and, with it, a realisation that some of the most innovative
and intelligent public servants are now to be found in the
town hall, not Whitehall. And they need a new ‘grey area’ —
between local and state power — to allow for new policy
innovations free from the fear of judicial review, let alone
rate-capping. They need the political capacity to pursue the
kind of commercial experiments which Manchester City
Council has pioneered, or the plans for the Post Office which
Essex County Council are experimenting with, or the city-
region powers which Leeds intends to exploit. Labour needs
a new mind-set committed to radical policy devolution at
both an economic and political level. 
The question, of course, is whether it’s possible to
carry out such party political re-engineering with the allure
of Whitehall — all those civil servants ready to do things —
ever present. It is also much harder to carry out with a party
structure hollowed out of councillors and activists at local
level. And then there is the political charge that this is hardly
the time, at the tail end of a parliament and after twelve
years in power, to bring out the familiar canard of local
empowerment. But the current crisis provides the perfect
moment to do just that. The Westminster model is
crumbling, MPs are reviled, the man in Whitehall does not
know best. Now, surely, is the time for Labour to recover its
civic identity, abandon its centralism and endow a new
social-democratic power balance. 
As the great Friedrich Engels once put it, ‘surprise
your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare
new successes, however small but daily … force your
enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength
against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of
revolution policy yet known: de l’audace, de l’audace, encore
de l’audace!’2
Dr Tristram Hunt, a former Labour special adviser, is lecturer
in history at Queen Mary, University of London and author of
‘The Frock-Coated Communist: The Revolutionary Life of
Friedrich Engels.
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1 Department of Work and Pensions, HBAI 119/5-2007/08, Households
Below Average Income, (May 2009)
2 Danton G-J, in a speech to the legislative Assembly in Paris (2
September 1792)
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double revolution
Jessica Asato
As politics as we know it implodes around us, it might seem
a little odd to focus on the internal cogs of the Labour party.
The typical invocation in times of political crisis is for
politicians to look outwards not inwards, but a debate about
where Labour goes from here and whether it has any chance
of regaining its status as a vehicle for progressive change in
the future, cannot ignore the structures of the party itself.
The vast majority of political commentators ignore what
happens in the constituency Labour parties meeting every
month in fusty church halls and tatty pub function rooms
across the country. Quite rightly the focus is on those at the
top. But it is in the branch meetings of the Labour party and
trade unions where Labour’s problems start, and where we
must shine a light to understand how Labour might try to
reconnect.
On evaluation, Labour’s structures are an unhappy
merger of old-fashioned, soviet-sounding bodies such as the
local ‘General Committee’ and powerless New Labour
creations such as the National Policy Forum. As part of New
Labour’s drive to protect policy-making from hard left
elements of the party, a new system of policy formulation
was created called ‘Partnership in Power’. Scarred by the
1980s where Militant Labour organised within the party and
issues such as unilateral disarmament dominated party
thinking, modernisers sought to create structures to give
voice to the mainstream of the party. The problem was that
the vast majority of people who joined Labour in the build-
up to victory in 1997 for one reason or another failed to get
involved in policy formulation and very quickly the new
structures were accurately seen as a way of silencing the
grassroots of the party.
By all accounts the new system has become irrelevant
to most Labour members, who are now resigned to letting
the government make policy. Which means that most
Labour meetings have reverted back to pointless
discussions, devoid of serious argument or real facts, which
are resolved by how many people belonging to one faction
or another bothered to turn up for the evening. Motions are
still written, and amended, and sent to various Secretaries of
State destined to end up in yet another waste paper basket.
To debate ideas and practical policy measures at a local
party meeting is like stepping into a time warp. It is a
perplexing situation given the many years of modernisation
and innovation that we have seen Labour pursue in
government, but it is not surprising given that Tony Blair,
and Gordon Brown since, have had no appetite for
reforming the party. And yet ‘producer capture’, something
which reforms of the public service were often introduced to
alleviate, is rife in the Labour party.
The psychology of members in the Labour party
would surely be an interesting study in human behaviour.
Many join with fierce conviction about their role in helping to
tackle injustice and poverty, and fight against elitism and
hierarchy. Yet the way people behave once they are Labour
members often seems to strike against the very values they
say they espouse. The organisation becomes a clique where
very little information is shared, dominated by the loudest
and those who have served the longest. New entrants are
treated with suspicion and not accepted into the fold until
they have either given up any sense of a social life by
accepting every committee position going, or deliver ten
rounds of newsletters on their own. Some members have an
extraordinary sense of entitlement and demand the right to
be listened to, purely by dint of paying subscriptions. When
the leadership doesn’t listen, a sense of victimisation takes
hold and all manner of conspiracy theories lead to bitterness
and sometimes unfathomable anger. For all Labour’s history
of peaceniks and Christian socialism, entering into local
Labour politics can often resemble being thrown onto the
battlefield.
This isn’t to say that Labour’s leadership is always
right to ignore the membership. On the contrary, many
issues such as the uproar after the 65p increase in the state
pension and the fact that not all tenants would accept
centrally imposed Arms Length Management Organisations,
were spotted quickly by local Labour members and could
have been avoided if there had been a little more listening.
But if Labour is going to stop its inevitable decline in
membership — it reached its lowest in Labour’s history in
2008 — Labour’s central structures must loosen their grip on
the local party just as the local party must loosen its grip on
who is allowed to be involved in policy-making, campaigning
and choosing Labour’s candidates.
Local parties very seldomly involve local residents in
their discussions about policy. To get away from the inward-
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looking nature of party debates, a duty should be
introduced on all constituency Labour parties to hold
meetings each year which allow local people to set the
agenda. Instead of Palestine, Columbian trade unionists and
Trident being key topics for discussion, party members
might have to face up to the fact that the vast majority of
residents care about more mundane things such as the lack
of activities for young people, school places and
unaffordable housing.
Labour’s manifesto process should demand that local
parties only submit ideas and policy documents to the
general policy-making pot if they can show that they have
reached their conclusions with the involvement of the
public. Not only will this bring in a sense of reality to
Labour’s internal debates, it will also force members to
become better informed and to internalise arguments rather
than parrot their own prejudices. The Labour movement
needs to return to the days of the Workers Education
Association set up in 1906, whereby those who are involved
are continually increasing the sum total of their knowledge,
and crucially, improving the political education and
involvement of the least advantaged in our society. It is
extraordinary that in all the debates over the last decade
about voter apathy, and all the hand-wringing about the fact
that it is those from the poorest social backgrounds who
turn out the least, Labour has done absolutely nothing as a
party to focus its efforts on engaging the very people it says
it exists to support. This could be funded, as they do in
Sweden, by a state levy to support political education and
training.
Embedding citizen voice in the Labour party has to be
an important way of ensuring that it reaches out to more
than the usual suspects, and also to show that there isn’t an
inbuilt progressive majority in the public. If anything, the
European results show that the public are deeply sceptical
of the European Union, and not on the basis that it’s a
capitalist club, but because they believe that it leaves them
powerless. Thence spring the inevitable concerns that many
of the problems Britain faces are down to external forces
rather than our own ability to shape our circumstances. The
fact that the BNP won two seats — despite one of the
biggest anti-fascist campaigns in the UK run by Searchlight
through the Daily Mirror — indicates racism in Britain but
also that some communities are so concerned about
immigration that their last resort is an extremist party.
Labour has been unable to find the answers to these issues
because we have been unwilling to make progressive
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arguments within these communities, preferring to leave it
to the government who instead of showing leadership
decided that giving the EU a dressing down at every
opportunity and creating lists of banned migrants to the UK
will convince people that Labour is on their side. It is a
strategy which has catastrophically failed and progressives
can only connect with those voters — who are in the most
vulnerable situations and deserve a Labour voice — by
becoming a mass political movement again.
One way we can start to create this is by embracing
the idea of primaries. If the average electorate in
constituencies is 70,000, and the average Labour
constituency membership is now around 400, that means
that the decision taken to select a Labour candidate is made
by a tiny proportion of the eligible electorate. No wonder we
have unrepresentative representatives. By allowing voters to
register their support for a political party, not only do we
give them a stake in the political process much earlier than
the election itself, but it will also give them an opportunity
to influence the thinking of Labour’s representatives before
they get into parliament. It means that a politician’s base is
not in their party, but truly in their community. It will also
enable Labour to reach out to supporters rather than just
members, thereby bringing in new influences and allowing
easier recruitment.
Introducing proportional representation could have a
similar effect of forcing the Labour party to take citizens’
concerns seriously. At the moment all efforts are focused on
winning marginal seats. Core vote areas are often
abandoned as Labour noticed to its horror in the Glasgow
East and Crewe by-elections. But it would also force Labour
to acknowledge that the duality politics we have been
operating for more than a century is failing our democracy.
Both far left and far right unite in their opposition to
proportional representation because they argue it fails to
provide strong government and can result in compromise,
coalition and concession. But why shouldn’t it? The public
don’t live their lives in black or white, but in shades of grey.
The ‘yah boo’, good versus evil politics of the two bench
House of Commons is so out of touch with the infinite
choices that ordinary people cope with in their daily lives.
Proportional representation would force politicians to be
smarter, to listen harder and work to explain why democratic
decision making requires difficult choices. Labour has spent
far too much time trying to find an answer to every problem,
rather than admitting to the public that politicians don’t
have all the solutions. There is a laziness in the argument
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about strong government which suggests that Labour
doesn’t think it can win on principle, so it has to fix in
practice. Labour has to get away from its fixer mentality of
thuggish whips and bully boys threatening
excommunication. Collective decision-making is important,
but only if the decisions are worth pursuing in the first place.
Finally, Labour needs to genuinely embrace
decentralisation. Senior government ministers have spoken
time after time about double devolution, the new localism
and other New Labour buzzwords, but apart from a few
local budgets which have been experimented with for
community parks and assets, local government has not seen
the benefit of their words. The government should be bold
and swipe 25 per cent of funding from Whitehall and
national quangos and give it, along with the requisite
powers, to the appropriate level of elected authority at a
local level. This should include introducing elected mayors
for every major conurbation with the option of allowing local
citizens to get rid of the mayoral system if they really don’t
like it. Labour must finally get rid of its daemons on local
government. Good local authorities are much more
professional and well run than they used to be in the 1980s,
they already have control of millions of pounds of taxpayer’s
money, but don’t have the authority to get on with the job.
Give them local tax-raising powers with the opportunity for
voters to positively vote for increases dedicated to specific
issues such as education or healthcare. It will increase voter
connection with the way their taxes are spent and
revolutionise the sterile debate we have in the Labour
movement about whether we should raise the top rate of
tax. If voters can see where their taxes are going, they are
more likely to think positively about giving more.
This is no time to hide in a bunker. Labour has one last
chance to reveal a radicalism which is at the core of New
Labour but has become hidden under layer after layer of
timid ministers, over-controlling civil servants, and fear of
the right-wing media. Labour needs a double revolution: a
reformed party which reaches out to its communities rather
than into its ever-shrinking self, combined with progressive
and lasting reform from the leadership. Electorally, nothing 
is inevitable, but if Labour is to avoid spending the next
decade in obscurity it must take the leap and not look back.
Jessica Asato is Acting Director of Progress.
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take to the streets
Rushanara Ali
In the past, Labour governments ran out of steam after only
a few years. By 1951, 1970 and 1979 they were visibly running
on empty. So the fact that it has taken 12 years for us to
reach this appalling convergence of ministerial resignations,
electoral meltdown and party panic could be read as quite
an achievement. But no one can be in any doubt about the
gravity of the crisis. An election which saw Labour come
fourth and fifth place in some regions, and where at its
worst the haemorrhaging of Labour’s share of the vote has
directly benefitted the far right, is a source of chronic
disappointment and shame.
So what is the root of the problem? It is not a lack of
talent, intellect or great policy initiatives; we have an
abundance of all of these as a party. At root our problem is
what so often happens to governments whether on the right
or left: it is the capacity of governments to lose touch with
ordinary people, a failure to have daily engagement with real
life. Everything else follows from that — the loss of empathy,
the loss of confidence and the loss of imagination and
courage. 
Governments come to expect that the public should
be grateful to them and then feel upset when none is
forthcoming. Yet the first rule of politics is that you should
never expect gratitude — the honour of serving should be
enough, and what matters more than what you achieved in
the past is what you offer for the future. This failure to
connect now risks giving Labour a ‘reverse Teflon’ effect —
where expenses scandals and anything else comes to be
blamed on the party. 
So what can be done? There are few quick fixes, but
the basic challenge is to address the growing disconnect.
That means re-engaging with the public, getting back in
touch, and thinking less like a government and more like a
social movement which builds the skills and talents of
ordinary people, makes them feel valued and recognised for
whatever contribution they make, for the sum of those
contributions are what built up the British Labour party from
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a workers movement to a political force to be reckoned with
in the 20th century.
At Labour’s heart is the idea of a political movement
built on social action and recognition of people’s potential
and capacity to make a difference. The Labour party was
built on such a rich history. In the East End of London the
birth of the Labour movement came from the struggles of
the match girl strikes, the subsequent trade union and
suffragette movements and later the struggles and battles
against Mosley’s fascists. It was the combined efforts of
workers, social reformers and campaigners that led to better
rights for workers and paved the way for a welfare state that
we continue to see as a source of pride in our society.
Reminding ourselves of the past and our tradition and
political heritage is not an attempt at nostalgia but a vital
counter to the risk of becoming too much part of the
establishment, too comfortable as what was once described
as ‘the natural party of government’ rather than a movement
of people from different backgrounds that helped bring
about such sweeping and positive change.
In the post 1997 era too little attention was paid to
how we remain a party of campaigning (in the broadest
sense) and activism. The momentum and sense of energy,
solidarity and goodwill that was built up was quickly
whittled away leaving disillusion and a sense of power-
lessness not only among activists, but many others whether
in government or elsewhere. The highly centralised,
advertising and London-media dominated approach in the
end brought with it a high cost, just as the Tories found in
the 1990s when their long involvement with Saatchi and
Saatchi ultimately left their party hollowed out.
This under-current of powerlessness and disillusion is
what the Labour party must address if it is to turn itself into
a healthy, vibrant movement with a renewed sense of
purpose. To do that, we need to build the skills of capacities
of the next generation of leaders at every level of the
community. We need to rediscover a way of campaigning
that builds a strong sense of solidarity and common
purpose. Technology has enormous potential, but it is an
enabler not a substitute for the face-to-face contact which
builds trust. We need ministers to be out listening and
sharing peoples’ lives, not simply walking from one meeting
or speech to another.
At the heart of such a movement has to be a 
narrative about what and who we are fighting for, one which
connects that fight to people’s everyday struggles, hopes
and aspirations and provides a voice for those who feel
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voiceless — whether that is the elderly people who are
fearful of rapid change in their communities, the young
unemployed graduate who made his family proud but
cannot get a job or the recession-struck cab driver who
waits hours before he can make a few pounds on a job.
A political party that is truly in touch with the public
draws new energy, ideas and a sense of purpose from such
insights and direct experiences. The Britain that Labour
inherited in 1997 was characterised by a very different set of
needs than those we face today — these are more complex
psychological needs such as anxiety and depression
combined with classic poverty and income inequality. Our
only hope now is to combine a more energetic radicalism —
on everything from long overdue constitutional reform to
social policy — with a return to what have always been the
true sources of our renewable energy: that combination of
frustration and hope that always ultimately drives
progressive change.
Rushanara Ali is Associate Director at the Young Foundation
and Labour parliamentary candidate for Bethnal Green and
Bow.
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This is a climactic moment for Labour, losing all its four
remaining county councils held and coming third behind
UKIP in the EU elections with a devastating slump to a mere
15 per cent of the national vote. The BNP breakthrough
sharpens the disaster of the worst election results for
Labour for nearly a century.
There are three main reasons for this: the expenses
scandal, the impact of the recession and the widespread
perception that the Labour Government is badly failing its
own supporters. Is the collapse of support for Labour for
these reasons fair? The picture is varied. The expenses
trauma has hit Labour harder even though the proportion of
offenders in the Tory party and the scale of their offences
are much greater. The recession has been attributed by the
government to toxic debts originating in the US, but it is
also true that even if that hadn’t happened, the ballooning
house price and credit card bubbles would still have burst,
probably sooner rather than later. The third count, the belief
that the government has simply not looked after its own
people, is certainly true. This point offers the best
opportunity in perhaps a generation for a fundamental
change of direction of politics in this country. Just as it
required the horror over the expenses revelations to spark
the demand for major democratic reform of Parliament, so
the plunge towards the absolute nadir of voter support 
may finally drive Labour to rediscover its historic role in
British politics. The left needs to be ready with a clear
alternative plan.
That plan, I believe, should concentrate on just three
to four key objectives, no more. They should be chosen to
mark out a clean break from the neoliberal finance
capitalism that New Labour has worshipped for the last
decade and made the centrepiece of all its policies. A
strategy focused on deregulation and privatisation,
unchecked corporate power and marginalisation of the
unions, unfettered markets seen as a solution for every
problem, and precedence given to the City over industry
and manufacturing has collapsed in a welter of uncontrolled
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greed and recklessness. We need an alternative economic
model, a rebalancing between the state and the markets and
a new modernised social democratic vision.
My choice of priorities would be as follows. First
finance, where the global downturn began. The banks
should be broken up so that never again by their reckless-
ness can they tip an economy and a whole society into deep
recession. The traditional commercial role of the banks —
lending to businesses and households — should be split off
from the much more risky investment banking role (as the
Glass-Steagall Act provided for in the US). No bank should
be allowed to become ‘too big to fail’, and their core function
of community investment should always get priority. To
prevent casino gambling in the financial markets, the banks
would be much more closely regulated to ensure adequate
capital ratios, to restrict or eliminate use of risky derivatives,
to close down tax havens and to monitor financial
speculation which would be made liable to a Tobin tax.
Second, housing. A massive house-building
programme should be started immediately for three
compelling reasons. There are now 1.77 million households
on council waiting lists and the lack of social affordable
housing is the single biggest cause of misery in Britain
today. House building has been allowed to collapse to its
lowest level since 1953. A campaign to drive up the number
of houses built to at least 300-350,000 a year, including at
least 100,000 social housing units a year, would provide one
of the best counter-cyclical ways of simultaneously tackling
the recession, meeting a desperate social need and
providing a big increase in jobs. Both housing and pensions
are major components of the Welfare State that New Labour
has sacrificed to the market, with disastrous effects in both
cases, and social need should once again take priority over
the ideology of markets and ownership.
A third priority which stands out currently is keeping
the Royal Mail in public hands and dropping the 30 per cent
part-privatisation which is souring an otherwise good Bill.
There is simply no case for risking a potentially terminal
collapse of Parliamentary Labour Party support when all
four of Royal Mail’s core business areas are now in profit for
the first time in two decades despite difficult trading
conditions — only seven years ago it was losing more than 
£1 million per day. There is even less of a case for handing
over Royal Mail to the Dutch TNT, which has just announced
a 50 per cent fall in profits and is disputing even the
payment of the minimum wage, while a sell-off to the private
equity firm CVC is unlikely to offer more than a short-term
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asset-stripping operation follows by another re-sale.
Dropping the privatisation element — a throwback to an
economic model now discredited — would send out a
dramatic signal that the government was genuinely listening
to public opinion and prepared to change course on an issue
of iconic importance to a majority of the electorate.
Fourth, Britain is more unequal than it ever was under
Thatcher. This is perhaps the worst indictment of all, though
a predictable result of operating an unfettered market
system and abandoning social democracy. It requires radical
action. The minimum wage should be raised significantly
from its present £5.83 an hour to £7 an hour, which would
have a big popular impact without provoking an increase in
unemployment. Even more dramatic would be the
introduction of a maximum ratio between top and bottom
pay within an organisation, on the very persuasive grounds
that the pay of senior grades was closely related to the
performance and commitment of junior grades.
But after the grotesque stretching of inequality at the
top over the last three decades it would not be
unreasonable, at a time of deep austerity for a majority of
the population, to require a bigger contribution from the
ultra-rich towards the general welfare. A 50 per cent rate on
earnings above £100,000 (affecting only the richest 2 per
cent of the population) would raise an extra £6.2 billion
according to Treasury estimates, while a 60 per cent rate 
on incomes above £250,000 a year would raise a further 
£3 billion above the 50 per cent rate. If that extra funding
were redistributed directly to the poorer half of pensioners
(with some tapering above) and others on the lowest
incomes, it could provide an uplift of £25 per week. That
would instil a dramatic change in public attitudes to the
Government’s direction of travel. Other plausible measures
could include charging capital gains tax at the same rate as
income tax, ending the non-domicile rule for tax exiles, and
introducing a wealth tax with a high threshold to limit
liability to the wealthiest 5 per cent of households.
One other measure would signal a radical break from
the past whilst laying the foundations for a more progressive
civil society, not just more equal but more demonstrably
accountable. The momentum of public anger on the back of
the expenses scandal should be harnessed to recreate the
mechanisms of effective representative politics. The
electorate should be given the right of ‘recall’ of errant MPs
who have been censured in parliament for a gross
misdemeanour. They should also have the right to have
public petitions, if they garner a high threshold of public
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support (say 5 per cent of the electorate), debated on the
floor of the House of Commons with a vote at the end so
that it is no talk-shop.
MPs on their side should be given real power to hold
the executive effectively to account, regaining their true role
as tribunes of the people, not the willing victims succumbing
to tribalism, loyalism and careerism. A Business Committee
should be set up elected by MPs on a secret ballot to run the
House agenda, whilst of course allowing the government
adequate time to get their legislation through. Cabinet
Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister should be ratified
by the appropriate Select Committee before entering office,
as in US Congressional hearings. Select Committees should
also be elected by all MPs by secret ballot, not chosen by
the Whips, in order to enhance the independent scrutiny of
government, and so that their reports don’t simply gather
dust on the shelf, some of the most important reports (as
prioritised by the Liaison Committee) should be debated on
the floor of the House on a motion drawn up by the
Committee chair with a vote at the end. And MPs should be
empowered to set up their own Commissions of Inquiry
when the Government refuses to do so, as for example over
the Iraq War, extraordinary rendition and the intelligence
failures over the 7/7 bombings.
Others will of course have their own preferences for a
reform agenda. But whatever is chosen, there are two
essential points. The change delivered has to be dramatic —
desirable tweaking of policy here and there simply won’t
have anything like the necessary impact, given that Labour’s
demise is near terminal. The other requirement is that it
must impact powerfully on people’s lives. There’s little point
in making the rich take a hit unless much poorer people feel
a significant consequential benefit in their own incomes.
Stuffing the mouths of the bankers with gold when they still
aren’t increasing lending to businesses and homeowners
should be replaced by a policy of using temporary public
control of them to compel a substantial and urgent increase
in lending to the real economy.
Labour is not finished. But, whoever is leader, only a
fundamental re-orientation of the party and the government
can give Labour a fighting chance over this next year.
Michael Meacher is former Environment Secretary.
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win hearts and minds
Lisa Harker and Carey Oppenheim
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The electorate’s message to the political class in the last few
months has been resoundingly clear. Public apathy towards
politics has spilled into frustration and anger. The distance
between the people and its representatives has been
exposed. Respect for the political class, already at a record
low, has plummeted. The local and European elections were,
more than anything, referenda on the political establish-
ment. And, as such, all the main political parties will need to
reflect on the verdict dished out by the electorate,
expressed in the form of a historically low turnout and a shift
to the populist vote. Labour nevertheless faces the greatest
challenge as the party in power. Deeply unpopular, stale,
directionless and tired, its fortunes look dire. Wiped out in
Wales and Scotland, it is already a party in tatters.
The worst thing Labour can do is focus on what it
needs to do to win the next general election, although this
of course is what self-preservation demands. The short term
view is dangerous because the disconnect between politics
and the populous cannot be fixed with a few policy changes
over the coming months; a fundamental shift in the way we
do politics is required.
First, Labour must start with an honest assessment of
the last decade. It has been responsible for many positive
changes: real improvements in public services, action on
climate change, achievements on work life balance. But
privately and publicly, Labour needs to acknowledge what
hasn’t worked. No one should underestimate how difficult
this will be. Labour needs to find a balance between being
blinkered or defensive and self-flagellation, often a tendency
for the left.
Several truths need to be acknowledged. Rising
unemployment, the stagnation of wages at the bottom and
growing repossessions all raise questions about how
sustained the progress has been. Substantially greater
investment in public services has not yielded equivalent
improvements in outcomes. Social policies have been less
effective in tackling deep-rooted problems than alleviating
their worst effects. Poverty has lessened and inequality has
been contained, but until the banking crisis there was no
challenge to the acceptability of very high rewards. There
has been no lasting change to the inequality in our society,
despite it casting a long shadow over so many aspects of
our lives. The bold ambitions on climate change have yet to
filter into changes to our economic model. The neoliberal
economic consensus has broken down and with it the social
democratic model of growth that yields income to distribute
in the pursuit of social justice. Aside from devolution to
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Labour has failed to
modernise the way we do politics, and the gulf between
politics and the people has grown.
Above all, Labour (and politics in general) has become
unremittingly managerialist, churning out well-intentioned
policies rather than honing a set of ideas, appealing to
hearts and minds and creating a shared national purpose.
This is where Labour now needs to make wholesale repairs,
rather than simply devising new policies in a desperate
attempt to keep afloat. Labour needs a compelling vision 
for our future as a nation: the values that should underpin
society, the economic model which we now need to build
and the measures by which we will judge progress in future.
So what might that vision be? Firstly, environmental
sustainability must become integral to our new economy,
rather than an add-on. The economic crisis provides the
chance to alter our model of economic growth founded on
the depletion of our natural resources. We should not miss
this once-in-a-generation opportunity. Achieving global
consensus and coordinated action will be very challenging —
particularly bridging the divide between the developed and
developing world — but action is no longer simply desirable,
it is now imperative. And there will need to be greater
consensus between the main political parties on climate
change. The challenge of climate change is too important to
be used for political point scoring — we need a consensus
for the sake of justice for and responsibility to future
generations.
The economic crisis also provides the opportunity to
rethink the balance between consumption and savings and
to recognise the way income and wealth inequality scars our
society. The Anglo-Saxon model of economic growth driven
by debt isn’t sustainable; the focus has to be on the new
drivers the economy, the new jobs and investment that will
be required. It will be important to move from ‘blaming the
bankers’ to a deeper articulation of why both the culture
and policies that underpin deep inequality need to change.
Our model of taxation, for example, will have to be
win hearts and minds
61
fundamentally reformed if we are to fully integrate the
taxation of income, wealth and carbon to align our
ambitions for the future with the way we live now.
Ironically, it looks as though the rescue package for
the economy is beginning to work, evidence of the
importance of state intervention to kick-start the economy
and protect the unemployed. But Labour will have to
engage in a discussion of how it is to limit public spending in
future years. Fighting the next election on investment versus
cuts will not be credible. This is an opportunity to look more
closely at the strengths and limits of the state in achieving
progressive social change. Where is state intervention
essential to support and drive the opportunities for the
disadvantaged? Will ‘progressive universalism’ be too
expensive? Where will it be essential to preserve collective
provision to bind society and share risks, and where should
support for the least well off be prioritised? These questions
need attention before the spending cuts begin, not once
they are upon us.
It is time for the Labour party to take a closer look at
how change happens. In the last decade Labour has often
overlooked the cultural drivers of change and how to shape
them. It has been too wedded to institutions, overlooking
the importance of what happens within families and
neighbourhoods. Labour’s policies have often been
predicated on economic rationality rather than social
psychology. Unsurprisingly, well-intended policies have not
had the impact hoped for.
More fundamentally, the economic turmoil has put the
spotlight on the values that drive us. The dominance of ‘neo-
liberal’ ideas is at an end. The marketisation of many aspects
of our lives is increasingly unattractive. As recession bites,
people are of necessity saving more, staying at home more,
changing some of their daily habits. Crisis brings with it the
recognition of interdependence and the importance of
mutual support. This is an opportunity to develop a notion
of citizenship that values empathy and brings new emphasis
to the bonds that bring us together and the common good.
But politics needs to change too. Britain needs a new
constitutional deal — one that is more pluralistic, which
addresses the unequal sharing of power in society and
challenges the professionalisation of politics. There is a need
to change the way that politics is conducted, to make
politics more inclusive and less alienating. And there is an
urgent imperative to open up the state to popular
participation and collaboration. Labour could start with
establishing a citizens convention, tasked with reviewing the
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political system. The convention would be made up of 150-
200 ordinary citizens, selected by lot like a jury. It would
take evidence at ‘town hall’ meetings around the country
and would recommend a number of options for reform.
These could be voted on by parliament or by the public in a
referendum. It has been done before: Canada and the
Netherlands have carried out similar experiments with
positive impacts on people’s desire to engage in politics.
All these factors caution against the kind of quick fix
approach so beguiling to a party staring into the abyss. But
a long-term focus would not only be better for the country,
it would also be best for politics and for Labour itself. As
long as attention remains fixed on the leadership of the
party and its fortunes at the next general election, Labour
will be unable to refresh its purpose and its vision for the
country’s future. And without a compelling vision for the
future, the party’s fortunes will remain very bleak.
The challenges that confront Labour are simply the
challenges that all the main political parties face writ large.
In a world that is less deferential and more global, yet
seemingly unable to secure its own future we need our
economic model to be re-thought, for our own wellbeing
and that of future generations. We need to shift politics
from its overly managerial focus to restore its ability to
transform. And, above all, we need a vision for future that
inspires us. In that sense, Labour’s challenges are not
confined to Gordon Brown, the Parliamentary Labour Party
or its members, but are shared by the entire political class.
Lisa Harker and Carey Oppenheim are co-directors of the
Institute for Public Policy Research.
win hearts and minds
63
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Martin Bright
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The Labour party has two interconnected crises to deal with:
a government in a state of collapse and a grassroots
movement in a state of despair. Such is the intensity of this
perfect political storm that the movement faces the very
real possibility of becoming irrelevant to the needs of the
British people in the 21st century. In order to survive it needs
to rediscover a facility for the two things it once did best:
efficient political campaigning and radical policymaking. In
order to demonstrate this I will take two examples from
recent political history. The first is the Go Fourth campaign
launched by John Prescott at last year’s Labour party
conference. The second is New Deal of the Mind, an
organisation launched at No. 11 Downing Street at the end of
March this year to lobby the government to recognise the
central role creativity and innovation would play in the
country’s economic recovery.
It would be difficult to forget the sweltering afternoon
last summer when I was called to John Prescott’s office to
discuss the future of the Labour party. It was a peculiar
gathering, not least because the former Labour deputy
leader decided to wear a very tight short-sleeved shirt,
which proceeded to unbutton itself during the course of the
meeting. Thankfully a couple of buttons remained fastened,
but I couldn’t help feeling that shirt was acting as a sartorial
symbol of the Labour party’s attempts to cover its
embarrassment.
The meeting itself had been called to plot the Go
Fourth campaign (then rather clumsily called Fourth Term
not Fourth Leader), which was designed to build a Labour
election victory under Gordon Brown. I thought it was a
laughable idea. Prescott and his co-conspirators, Alastair
Campbell, Glenys Kinnock and Richard Cabourn clearly had
the interests of the party at heart. But the idea that these
veteran campaigners were organising anything other than a
sideshow seemed absurd.
But the Go Fourth campaign was onto something. The
Labour party desperately needed to rediscover its taste for
campaigning and begin to make its members feel good
about themselves again. Since then Prescott has been
tirelessly touring the country in an election-style battle-bus
taking the government case to voters. Since last summer, he
has also taken his campaign online and become an avid
blogger.
As it turned out, Go Fourth was very popular with the
Labour grassroots and acted as one of the few unifying
forces at a horribly fractured and sectarian Labour party
conference last year. It is, therefore, no surprise that John
Prescott was so furious that his party’s campaigning for the
European elections was so poor — especially as it so nearly
invested a different meaning in the words Go Fourth.
The lesson from the Go Fourth campaign is that
morale within the party can be shored up, even in the most
depressing circumstances, at least for a short period. But
this is not a programme for government, merely a coherent
expression of the desire not to lose and an attempt to
rescue a modicum of pride. Also, and this is crucial, Go
Fourth is a campaign run by the old guard of New Labour, a
group of politicians from the last century that will find it
difficult to build a vision of the future.
This brings us to the next generation. For too long
Labour’s forty-somethings have lived in the shadow of the
big beasts who brought the party back from the brink in the
1990s. This group, which I once dubbed the Adrian Mole
generation because they are the same age as Sue
Townsend’s hero, now dominates the Labour landscape and
will almost certainly provide the party’s next leader. Ed Balls,
the two Milibands, James Purnell, Liam Byrne, Andy
Burnham and Yvette Cooper all fall into this category. Their
weakness is that they are a naturally cautious group, bruised
by the personal experience of leaving university into the last
recession and dependent for their political career on the
patronage of either Tony Blair or Gordon Brown. They are
also a fractured group with no natural solidarity.
Until the resignation of James Purnell, the younger
generation had never shown a genuine desire to seize
control of the party and make it their own. It may now be
that this job falls to as-yet-unknown Labour Party activists in
their 20s and 30s, although the concern is that they may be
even more conventional and risk averse than the Adrian
Mole generation. What is certain is that until someone
grasps the nettle and wrests control of the party from the
dead hand of the New Labour old guard, the party will
continue its drift into oblivion. Purnell understood this
(better late than never) and his resignation letter was a
model of clarity. The failure of other members of the Cabinet
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to follow his lead demonstrates that he may be the
exception that proves the rule that his generation lacks the
political boldness to turn around Labour’s fortunes.
In recent months I had been working with James
Purnell and his officials at the Department of Work and
Pensions on options for putting into practice the ideas of the
New Deal of the Mind, a charity which grew out of an article
I wrote for the New Statesman in January. In this I argued
that British politicians like Gordon Brown, who invoked the
spirit of the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, should look to
the cultural projects spawned by US investment in arts and
culture in the 1930s (writers Saul Bellow and John Cheever
and artists Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock all worked on
New Deal projects). Since then New Deal of the Mind has
been working across government and the arts and creative
sector to develop a coherent strategy to innovate our way
out of the recession and prevent a generation of young
people being lost to the nation.
It struck me that Purnell was one of the few Cabinet
ministers still thinking strategically about policy (others
included Andy Burnham at the Department for Culture and
John Denham at the now defunct Department of Innovation,
Universities and Skills). One of the consequences of Gordon
Brown ‘refreshing’ his Cabinet has been that much of the
work that has been done to build relationships and trust
across the creative industries will have to begin again.
Despite the desperate state of the government there
are still some potentially promising ideas knocking around.
The Future Jobs Fund, which provides a subsidy for
employers willing to take on a 14-18 year old at risk of long
term unemployment, and the Young Person’s Guarantee,
which promises to find work for young people unemployed
for over a year, are both attempts to tackle the
unemployment tsunami about to hit Britain. The Graduate
Talent Pool proposed by DIUS to match graduates to
internships is the seed of a good idea and the proposals
from the Communities and Local Government department
to fill empty high street businesses with creative ‘pop-up’
shops could also help. But without coordination, they risk
becoming just another set of eye-catching initiatives.
More seriously, the money for these initiatives will only
come through next year when it may already be too late for
those it is intended to help and certainly too late to help the
government out of its predicament. But if the party believes
what it says about putting policy before personality, there is
an urgent need to fast-track money to projects that can put
people to work immediately. Civil servants are presently
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working on funding mechanisms for these schemes. The
best thing the Prime Minister could do to provide a
meaningful legacy would be to set up an emergency jobs
fund for high-profile projects that could be started this
summer and put young people back to work right now.
At the same time, one of the most useful jobs that
could be carried out by Tessa Jowell in the Cabinet Office or
Lord Mandelson in his new Department of Everything would
be to coordinate all the work being done to stimulate
employment and tackle the recession. This is what the
Labour party is supposed to be for, as the name suggests.
Martin Bright is a political journalist and founder of New Deal
of the Mind.
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Labour has not conducted a serious debate about its values,
vision or political strategy since the 1992 general election
defeat and the creation of New Labour in 1994-95. There
was no sustained attempt to do this after a decade in power
or during the 2007 leadership transition. This has mostly
been deemed unnecessary, mirroring Richard Crossman’s
observation half a century before, as he described the
exhaustion of the Attlee government after a period of
unprecedented progressive advance in 1951, that Labour had
‘lost its way not only because it lacked maps of the new
country it is crossing, but because it thinks maps
unnecessary for experienced travellers.’
The recent nadir in Labour’s political fortunes make
clear that a new route-map is urgent and overdue. But is
Labour capable of debating its contours in a way which
does not excarbate the party’s problems further? The scars
of past civil wars have created an excessive fear of open
political debate. There is no serious or deep ideological gulf
in the Labour party today, yet the party’s internal debates
remain inward-looking and polarised around a set of no-win
propositions between vocal minority factions on the right
and left of the party.
The party has somehow fallen into debating which
voters it does not want — the left worries about pitching too
narrowly to Mondeo Man and Middle England, while the right
warns that cheering the heartlands or the Guardianistas will
be a recipe for defeat. Neither need to worry about being
too popular with the wrong people — the party is retreating
to the margins with just 7.5 percent of the European vote 
in the south-east of England while trailing the Conservatives
in Wales.
This electoral strategy debate symbolised a broader
existential question: for or against New Labour? So what
passes for a debate about ‘renewal’ involves calls to cleave
ever more boldly, and verblessly, to the mantras and
methods of New Labour circa 1997, challenged by those who
wish the last 15 years had never happened. The truth is that
New Labour has delivered the most successful era of
progressive advance for half a century, and that it is clearly
now over.
Gordon Brown always faced a difficult task on coming
to power, with Labour’s electoral coalition fragmenting after
a decade in power, even before his premiership coincided
with the end of the Faustian bargain of the finance-led
growth on which Labour’s investment in public services and
modest redistribution rested. But the strategic weakness of
Gordon Brown’s premiership has been that having run on a
‘change’ ticket, he has governed on continuity, and has not
set out an animating argument for his government in terms
that the public can understand. Yet there has been no
suggestion that anything different would be on offer from
anybody else.
There has been very little discussion of how the party
can answer the strategic political challenges, which are easy
to set out, if somewhat harder to resolve: What is the
candid, progressive account of Britain in 2010 which voters
will recognise? What would Labour’s case be as to what —
after 13 years in power — it wants another term in office 
for? And what distinctively Labour argument could yet
challenge the right, and seek to reunite Labour’s fracturing
electoral coalition?
The key to addressing this challenge may depend on
understanding that the call for Labour to be more
ideologically rooted is not a recipe for retreat to its comfort
zone, but rather a foundation for a more pluralist approach
to centre-left politics.
Firstly, if New Labour’s breadth was once its core
strength, the price has been a difficulty in articulating what
Labour is for in positive terms. This has left Labour
apparently unable to construct a clear choice between the
major parties in terms that are meaningful to the public. The
Labour government will be unable to launch a successful
fightback on policy while the problem of a lack of clear
public political definition remains.
Secondly, generating a progressive policy wish-list will
not be enough without also building the coalitions to
support them. New Labour’s political culture is now a
significant barrier to its ability to engage with new sources
of progressive change, and recent events have
demonstrated that talking about ending command and
control is not the same as actually doing so.
For all its troubles, Labour retains a solid parlia-
mentary majority but, in theory at least, the bully pulpit to
frame public political debate. The party needs to ask itself
how it can use eleven months of power in a way which
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would entrench its political legacy by testing its political
opponents to accept or challenge its arguments about what
fairness means in Britain today.
So what are those arguments? Labour’s fundamental
proposition is that life chances in Britain are unfair and too
unequal — and should be fairer and more equal. The core
fairness test could be this: that we should not inherit our life
chances at birth. In Britain today, where we are born and
who our parents are still matters far too much in
determining our opportunities and outcomes in life. And so
our own choices, talents and aspirations count for too little.
The vision of a free and fair society would be one that
extends to us all the autonomy to author our own life
stories, and challenges the extent to which this is
determined by forces beyond our control. This fight against
fate — breaking the cycle of disadvantage to make life
chances more equal — could provide the lodestar to guide
future action and campaigns for equality.
The disagreement between the major parties is
primarily about the role and responsibility of government.
The Conservatives say that the Labour record proves that
the state has failed. Indeed, Cameron’s claim to be the true
progressive is founded on his claim that Conservatives know
that it is not the state’s job to act on the important
progressive causes of social inequality, climate change or
international development. What this will involve, beyond
the occasional nudge towards social responsibility, is far
from clear. Labour’s argument must be the opposite:
‘fairness doesn’t happen by chance’. Labour has tried to
advocate the ‘enabling state’ so as to avoid a ‘big state’
impression. But this argument about means is unlikely to
resonate publicly and has not done so. The way to 
animate this argument is to find a handful of symbolic but
significant ‘fairness’ policies that test claims to stand for
equal opportunity and distributional fairness in an 
economic recession.
This does not mean that Labour needs to be statist.
Indeed, this argument also has the potential to fuse together
liberal and social democratic agendas: if autonomy is the
liberal end, then the social democratic concern is for the
distribution of autonomy. (Hence the centrality of a similar
argument in Reeves and Collins’ Demos pamphlet The
Liberal Republic,1 which stresses that this should be
fundamentally an agenda about the redistribution of power,
with income and wealth one of a number of means to that
broader end). Agnosticism about means is a good idea once
the question of what the ends are is clear, and as long as
the fight against fate
70
some credible means are being willed. But the debate about
the state this risks being a primarily rhetorical debate when
no party envisages the state being much smaller than 40 per
cent of GDP in the next few years.
On the response to the recession, the government’s
position may be much more credible than the opposition’s
plans to cut spending now — at the lowest point in the cycle
— to pay off debt more quickly. But the arguments for a 
fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing and multilateral reform 
at the G20, while important and necessary, have not been
publicly salient. The great issue should be jobs, and youth
unemployment in particular. The government should build
on its graduate job guarantee scheme (and look at intro-
ducing this earlier than 12 months) and take up Professor
David Blanchflower’s proposals to defuse a youth unemploy-
ment crisis which risks creating a lost generation.2 This has
the advantage of being a cross-class issue where the
electoral politics work.
The government also needs to have a ‘what not to
spend’ agenda if it is to protect priority areas. Much of this is
politically difficult. But they might as well take those
opportunities where the unpopular is also unaffordable:
rather than a slow lingering death for ID cards, announce
that they are no longer to be pursued in changed
circumstances.
The need for a new politics
Labour would have done much more to sow the seeds of its
own political revival had it pursued a deeper agenda of
constitutional reform and progressive cooperation from a
position of political strength in 1997. It is much more difficult
to do this at five minutes to midnight. The Liberal Democrats
would legitimately fear being tainted by a contaminated
Labour brand. So there is little prospect of starry-eyed Lab-
Lib cooperation, even if this remains in the strategic
interests of both parties in the long-term.
Labour’s constitutional record is now underrated. The
1997–2001 Parliament delivered the most significant and
enduring constitutional changes. However, this has been
undermined by Labour’s growing reputation for traditional,
and even authoritarian, governing instincts, while Brown’s
promise to revive the agenda with a ‘new constitutional
settlement’ had largely turned into a tidying-up exercise
rather than anything likely to fundamentally reconnect
public trust in politics.
Still, there are a series of moves that Labour could
make on its own part to revive both constitutional reform
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and an agenda of progressive pluralism. Firstly, Labour is in
power and well placed to determine whether political reform
should be substantive or primarily symbolic. The Prime
Minister should set the election date as 6 May 2010, legislate
for fixed term parliaments as part of a broader constitutional
reform agenda. While David Cameron’s reform agenda is
largely cosmetic, most of Nick Clegg’s proposed 100-day
reform agenda would find much support in the Labour 
Party. And there is growing Labour support for the idea 
of a citizens convention which would give away to citizens,
not politicians, the chance to determine the content of
reform. (Demos piloted a version of this on MPs’
allowances). A referendum on electoral reform, in which the
government would support change, remains the crucial
driver of a more pluralist politics. This could be on the
Jenkins AV+ proposals or a reform package that involved
the Alternative Vote for the Commons with a proportionally
representative, elected senate. It could achieve the hybrid
solution that Jenkins sought, that is, a tendency to majority
governments with pluralist checks and balances on the
excesses of majoritarian power.
Secondly, while there is no question of electoral pacts
between parties, there is little to stop Labour taking
unilateral action if it believes it is in its own interests to do
so. In particular, does it make sense for Labour to contest
those 30 or so Liberal Democrat seats where the
Conservatives are second and Labour not in contention?
There would be some Labour anxiety about retreating from
contesting these areas. However, a good case can be made
for doing so if the party does commit to electoral reform, for
the final first-past-the-post election. The voters can
probably work much of this out for themselves, but it would
again symbolise a commitment to political pluralism, while a
Labour fightback could make some of these seats crucial in
determining whether the Conservatives can get a majority.
Thirdly, it makes sense to go into an election in which
a hung parliament would be a positive political achievement
with a manifesto which did not contain ‘red line’ veto points
which would make post-election cooperation across parties
impossible. Again, ID cards are one obvious symbolic
casualty. In the event that the scenario might arise, it would
be much better to change policies before they are put to 
the voters than afterwards. This would often have the 
added bonus of removing some veto points for potential
voters too.
Above all, Labour’s ability to recover as a governing
force in British politics will depend on its ability to root itself
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more clearly in Labour values and articulate its own positive
mission for a fairer society. But this must also be combined
with a decisively more open and pluralist approach to the
way in which it does politics.
Sunder Katwala is General Secretary of the Fabian Society.
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British politics is characterised today by crisis. Not just one
crisis, but several. Most fundamentally, there is the emerging
environmental crisis of climate change. Second, there is the
ongoing economic crisis, precipitated in the financial system.
Third, there is a crisis in the political system, epitomised by
the controversy over MPs’ expenses, but with much deeper
roots. And fourth, there is a crisis within Labour. For the
media, this is a crisis of leadership. But it is also, more
fundamentally, a crisis of purpose, one might even say a
crisis of meaning. What, after all, is Labour for?
Pragmatists in government might regard such
questioning as idle. The present government has a ready
answer to what Labour is for: it’s there to manage crisis. The
public expects us to ‘get on with the job’ of taking the
country out of recession, to reform the political system, and
so on. But this answer won’t do.
For one thing, it too easily evades the question of how
far Labour itself is implicated in these crises. Did Labour’s
conversion to the market in the 1990s go to excess and lead
to a failure to appreciate some old-fashioned insights about
possibilities of market failure? Did Labour’s traditional
philosophy of the state, based on a conservative ideal of
parliamentary sovereignty, contribute to the current crisis of
the political system? Coming to terms with the crises
requires Labour to take a hard look at its own, well-
entrenched habits of thought.
Second, it is not as if there is one single right way to
manage a crisis. There is opportunity — Rahm Emanuel
recently said ‘never let a crisis go to waste.’ Just think of the
way Margaret Thatcher used the severe economic crisis of
the 1970s to launch a radical attack on the post-war
settlement. There was nothing pre-determined about this.
The crisis could have been managed in many other ways
(with pluses and minuses relative to the Thatcher approach).
But Thatcher and her supporters had a clear sense of what
they were for. They had a reasonably clear sense of their
values and a vision of the society they wanted to create. So
they knew what they wanted to do with the crisis.
As I cannot address all of the crises here, let’s focus on
the political crisis and the opportunities it presents. First, the
backdrop of Labour’s competing conceptions of politics. It
may be hard to credit, but Labour was born as a party
dedicated to far-reaching political reform. Labour and the
New Social Order, the party’s first statement of aims and
values, published in 1918, proposed a range of sweeping
changes to the UK political system.
However, Labour very quickly became a party of
political conservatism. Having shoved the Liberals aside
more emphatically than the party might initially have
expected, and emerged as one of the two major parties in a
two-party system, Labour grew strongly attached to the
established institutions of the British state. A distinctive
‘Labourist’ philosophy of politics and the state emerged
which is still with us today.
Labourism starts with the assumption that that Labour
is properly the single representative of progressive opinion.
Second, and particularly after the Second World War, Labour
drifted towards a strong attachment to the power of the
central state. The aim of progressive politics is, therefore, to
get Labour control of the central state. Third, Labour
became attached to a conservative parliamentarianism. It
embraced the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the
existing first-past-the-post electoral system. For only this
system could credibly hope to deliver Labour — and Labour
alone — control of the all-important central state.
The Thatcher era, which saw radical reform pushed
through on a minority of the popular vote, increased the
sensitivity of Labour-aligned thinkers to the ills of ‘elective
dictatorship.’ Labour’s more pluralist and federalist approach
to politics, which had been submerged in the 1920s, started
to reasserted itself.
Initially, it looked as if New Labour might well
incorporate this re-emerging pluralist and federalist
approach. Devolution to Scotland and Wales remained an
important objective, and one that was swiftly acted on after
1997. The first New Labour government established the
Jenkins Commission to consider reform of the electoral
system. Blair was clearly interested in coalition with the
Liberal Democrats.
However, the scale of Labour’s victory in 1997, and its
subsequent domination of electoral politics, tempted the
party back into its familiar comfort zone. The report of the
Jenkins Commission was politely but emphatically shelved.
Talk of coalitional politics at Westminster evaporated. In its
second term, Labour began to speak about a ‘new localism’.
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However, this was little more than Orwellian euphemism for
old-style centralism. The centre remained firmly in control of
what local decisions were to be devolved, to whom and on
what terms. What central government determined one day,
it could tear up the next.
Retreating into this comfort zone was, of course, a
Faustian pact for Labour. Under the first-past-the-post
system, Labour can hope to form parliamentary majorities in
a way it can’t under a proportional electoral system. But to
do so it must win over floating voters in a relatively small
number of competitive constituencies. These voters have
policy preferences on the centre-right — arguably to the
right of the nation’s median voter. So Labour’s dominance in
parliamentary terms demands a policy platform that tracks
to the centre-right. Over time, this generates confusion and
disillusionment. It helps explain why we have reached a point
where we have to ask the question: ‘What is Labour for?’
At the same time, the existing system has growing
problems of legitimacy. Although electoral turnout shows a
downward trend in many countries, the decline in the UK
since New Labour came to office has been unusually severe.
As the main parties jostle for that elusive centre-right
floating voter, the range of political choice declines. Citizens
are inclined then to ask an even more basic and worrying
question: ‘What is politics for?’
The scandal over MPs’ expenses has produced a rare
moment in British politics. Basic questions about the nature
and structure of the political system have left the seminar
room. Again, the crisis presents opportunity. The
opportunity is to fundamentally reshape the political system
to make it more accountable and empowering. Proposals for
reform are bouncing off the walls: fixed-term parliaments;
electoral reform; ‘open primaries’ for candidate selection;
new proposals for devolution of power to the local level.
One approach is for the Labour government to huddle
in on itself, decide which of these proposals it likes, and
present a constitutional reform package to Parliament. This
is the direction in which Gordon Brown appears to be going
with his proposed National Council for Democratic Renewal.
This would be a mistake. It fails to see how the process
of reform must itself address the problem that has
prompted the demand for change: the disconnection
between public and political elite — indeed, a disconnection
between many people and democratic politics itself. There is
also a basic matter of principle here. If we are — finally —
accepting the idea that the people are sovereign, and this is
a moment of constitutional change, then shouldn’t the
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people have some real, active involvement in determining
the course of change?
Instead of convening a National Council for
Democratic Renewal which will tell the people what
constitutional reforms are good for them, a coalition of
organisations has argued that the government should
organise an inclusive and deliberative process that will
enable the public to present its own ideas for reform. Key
here is the idea of a citizens’ convention similar, though
probably on a larger scale, to the Demos citizen’s
convention held last week on MPs allowances. This would
bring together an assembly of people, chosen at random, 
to deliberate about the future of the political system. Their
deliberation would be assisted by specialists and advocates
who could put the cases for and against alternative
proposals. Participants would listen to the experts, talk
about the issues between themselves, and develop their
own proposals. These proposals might then go to a
referendum. Of course, the numbers involved in the
convention itself would be small (100-300). So the
convention itself would need to be embedded in a wider
consultation, ideally going right down to each
neighbourhood, each community centre and hall.
Underpinning this approach is a distinctive philosophy
of the state, a radical alternative to Labourism, with much
wider relevance to addressing our present crises. This is the
philosophy of democratic republicanism, whose aim is to
disperse property and power amongst individuals, but also
to reinvigorate the public sphere by expanding the arenas of
democratic decision-making and by encouraging active
citizen involvement in these arenas.
In the economic sphere, it directs our attention back
to the much neglected issue of the distribution of wealth
(not just income, but wealth) and to the even more
neglected question of how those who control the allocation
of wealth through investment can be made more
accountable to ordinary savers. And it certainly has
relevance to the incipient environmental crisis: it is only an
active, campaigning citizenship, akin to that represented by
the Transition Towns and Climate Camp movements, which
is likely to bring pressure to bear for serious action on
climate change.
Democratic republicanism has always been a dissident
strain in Labour thinking. Part of connecting with this
tradition, however, is changing the way Labour does politics
itself. It means less top-down definition of policy and more
attention to how Labour can help organise and participate in
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movements for reform from the bottom-up. It means letting
go of the arrogant and false idea that Labour has a
monopoly on progressive politics. It means that Labour has
to connect with and give critical support to a wider citizen
activism for a more socially responsible and thereby free,
and equal, society. This, at least in part, is what Labour is for.
Stuart White is a lecturer in Politics and Director of the
Public Policy Unit at the University of Oxford.
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Recently I asked a woman I know from the Midlands what it
would take to get her to vote Labour again. She should be a
textbook party supporter. Her husband earns only a little
over the average wage, although he is in his forties. She has
a part-time, term-time-only job that brings in around
£12,000 a year. They have three children, a large mortgage
on a small and rather dilapidated terraced house, no pension
provision and no savings. Their fridge rarely contains much
more than carrots, economy sausages, cheap butter and
cheap cheese. They holiday by going camping in England;
they eat out only on a birthday. Her contempt for Labour
now runs so deep that she almost spits as she speaks.
Nothing, she says. Nothing would get her to support
them. She now thinks they are nasty, controlling, inefficient
and wasteful. She doesn’t think they care or understand
about the difficulties of ordinary people’s lives. She should
have been the grateful beneficiary of many of Labour’s
spending initiatives. But she’s scathing about what that has
actually meant.
Her family had tax credits for two years, which was a
joy, despite the fact that they had three conflicting
statements of entitlement in the first year, and four in the
second. Hours were spent holding on the phone and
repeating herself as she tried to clarify what she was meant
to get. Then in the third year, like hundreds of thousands of
other families, she had a peremptory letter saying she had
been overpaid and must return thousands of pounds
immediately. The demand was financially disastrous — the
family had to take out a bank loan for repayment — but
what was much worse was the manner and the tone of the
way it was done. ‘We were in a panic, and they made us feel
like criminals. They never said “we’re sorry, we made a
mistake”. We’ll never, ever, claim again. They give you
money and snatch it back — they make you feel so helpless.
They treat you like rubbish.’
She is just as disillusioned with the tens of millions
spent in her area. The town now has a flashy new pool with
slides and wave machines, but — presumably to pay for it —
all the old, convenient, local pools have been closed down.
The new one is two bus rides away and much more
expensive, so her children rarely go swimming any more. Her
children’s school was expensively rebuilt, but the new school
is full of design faults, now excludes parents from its
classrooms, and has, as it reopened, shut down the choirs
and orchestras which used to give the place so much of its
life. Meanwhile the friendly local sub-Post Office has been
closed, meaning a long walk to join a long queue at the
bleak Crown Post Office in the centre of town.
I could go on. There are her relatives’ experiences in
hospitals, with careless or indifferent nurses not bothering 
to take immobile patients to the lavatory, or dress them
again when they strip in confusion, or get them the
medicines they need before the pharmacies shut. There is
her rage about the ridiculous public-sector jobs she knows
of, with one acquaintance so under-employed in his post as
a checker of targets in the NHS that he has built up a small
buy-to-let portfolio by trawling the net and making
purchases in his working time. There is her anger about
Labour’s threatening tone on civil liberties and its desire to
put the state’s tentacles into everybody’s lives by tracking
their behaviour on mass databases. And that’s before she
starts on her real fear for the family’s jobs after Labour’s
mismanagement of the economy and her fury at the way
these bullying, publicly preaching politicians turn out to
have been privately cheating their way into greater 
personal wealth.
This sense of disillusion goes much deeper than the
current questions of who did, should, or might lead the
Labour party. I write about this woman’s reactions — let’s
call her Sue — because I think her experiences illustrate the
deep and fundamental error that Labour has made in its
approach to policy over the last dozen years. In the absence
of ideology, it set out to provide two things; efficiency and
economic growth. Everything would be measured in terms
of numbers and money.
Labour thought politicians could measure outcomes
just as businesses did. So just as a new modern factory
could automatically be regarded as an investment, so a new
school or hospital could be assumed to be the same.
Thousands of post offices could be shut down because they
didn’t make enough money, as if they were loss-making
branches of a shop. Cottage hospitals, bus routes, train
services and local surgeries could all be closed in the name
of efficiency. Out-of-town supermarkets could suck the life
out of town centres because cheap food mattered more
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than maintaining communities. Managers could run public
services and measure their success by hitting targets, just as
if they were producing refrigerators or cars. And all of those
statistics to prove success could be presented to the public
just as if they were being presented to shareholders, or a
company board.
The fundamental flaw in this approach is that the
individuals that make up the electorate are not a company
board. To us, what matters is not the numbers, but our
experience, and that of the people we know. Sitting next to a
dying and neglected man in a new but dirty hospital shapes
our opinion of the NHS much more profoundly than being
told that health spending has tripled in ten years. Finding
that the rigid school curriculum alternately frightens,
alienates and bores our children affects our view of
education far more than hearing that exam results are on a
constant upward rise. The intransigence and robotic
responses of staff in benefit offices, social services, or local
councils, does not convince us that the state is there to help
us or that all the money that’s gone into it has been
worthwhile.
We do not stand outside the actions of government 
as observers, dependent on reports for proof. We live 
what they do to us. We don’t make our judgements
according to the statistics. What matters to us is how
government decisions make us feel about our lives. All too
often Labour, with its harsh emphasis on targets, central
controls, efficiency and the unchallenged primacy of
markets, has left people feeling impotent, unimportant and
alarmingly adrift.
Labour cannot revive as long as it holds to this sterile
and outdated view of what drives people. It was born of the
management theories of the 1980s, and in the business
world this has long been discredited. We are not
economically driven automatons, seeking efficiency, or
growth. As the latest research on the brain proves, we are
primarily social animals, driven by emotion, easily hurt or
enraged, acutely aware of our relative status and deeply
dependent on the daily encounters we have with others to
give our lives meaning.
What we want, above all, is to matter. We are terrified
of invisibility, of indifference, of being irrelevant to the world.
In our private lives, we want love. In public, we want
consideration, acknowledgment, respect. And we don’t want
the world around us to keep changing in ways that displaces
our sense of who we are and leaves us feeling that we have
no control.
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We care less about whether a hospital is new than
whether a nurse treats us with tenderness, and a doctor with
kindness and concern. When a high street decays and local
shops shut we lose the reassurance of familiarity, and the
sense of being recognised and known. If we lose our jobs
and find the benefit staff treat us with contempt, we are
seared by that loss of status and identity.
Politicians and policy makers in the Labour party have
been remarkably oblivious to these crucial elements of our
lives, perhaps because their powerful jobs provide them with
so many positive reinforcements about themselves that they
cannot see their significance for those who are less
cushioned from the world. Nor did they feel they needed to
explore alternative policies, or question the results of their
own, while their creed of permanent economic growth
looked so successful and unchallenged.
That philosophy has been smashed to pieces by the
economic meltdown. Labour has basically assumed that you
can constantly increase public spending, while engaging in a
little stealthy redistribution, on the back of an endlessly
expanding economy. Their promise to the public has been:
you may be tossed around on the sea of market forces, but
at least we will make you richer. You wouldn’t know it to
listen to the party’s current leaders, but that model is dead.
The austerity that’s looming, but rarely mentioned, won’t be
over in the next few years. Our debt to China and the Far
East means we’ve no alternative but to see their living
standards increase while ours stays static or falls, perhaps
for decades.
Labour’s thin, unsatisfying market and target-driven
conception of society has been categorically rejected by
voters this week. It hasn’t met people’s needs. Labour
cannot continue to base its appeal on promising riches in
the future. Instead it must develop a new politics of
meaning, in which it has to see people not chiefly as
economic actors, who must be freed to maximise their
individual interests, but as complex human beings whose
sense of self, purpose and satisfaction cannot be separated
from their place in the social web. It has to think much more
about psychology, sociology, family structure and people’s
need for social and civil networks than it has ever bothered
to do in the past.
A politics of meaning will constantly pose the question
of how to make all of us feel that our existence has value
and significance. It will draw on research like Robert
Putnam’s work on the importance of civil society, and
Wilkinson and Pickett’s studies into the devastating social
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and psychological impacts of relative inequality. It is likely to
mean much greater localism, so that people have more
power over decisions affecting them. It will discourage
politicians from authoritarianism or from empty-gesture
announcements, since the criteria will always be: how will
this affect what the population currently values about their
lives?
It will be naturally but not exclusively concerned 
about the bottom half of society, since richer people have
greater agency and status to reassure themselves. It will 
ask how all children are to grow up with a sense of 
purpose, how we motivate and give pride to the teenager
currently destined for a life on the minimum wage, how we
address the desperate loneliness of a wealthy widow, how
we integrate excluded minorities. It will recognise and
respond to the furious displacement that people feel as their
known worlds disintegrate in the face of immigration and
economic collapse. The protest votes that we have seen this
week, like those for UKIP and the BNP, are cries of anguish
from people who are saying; we don’t want to feel so 
powerless, and we don’t know where we fit in. It’s a plea 
for meaning.
Labour’s founding philosophy was that ordinary men
and women mattered, and that everyone should have the
chance to flourish. Its origins were based on an
understanding of the profound importance of mutual
dependence and of responsibility to one another. A century
later, we live in a different world. We want to be free and
autonomous individuals, but our fundamental human needs
for recognition, connection and a sense of stability remain. A
politics of meaning could start to deal with those conflicting
desires, in an age of austerity, and link the party to its values,
to its future, and its past.
Jenni Russell is a columnist for the Guardian.
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build a liberal republic
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The Labour party is about to shift to the left. It will lose very
badly at the next general election if it remains committed to
its current course. It will then be severely depleted and it will
have to conduct an inquest in an atmosphere of
recrimination. It is very probable that this will produce a shift
to the political left — not a wild lurch, but a move to the left.
This will be welcomed by the bulk of the party who
will embrace the leadership’s return to the position occupied
by party activists. And it will be a colossal disaster for as
long as it lasts. Whether or not this position is
philosophically correct — in my view it isn’t — it is politically
hopeless. The electorate never elects the Conservative party
because the Labour party is insufficiently left-wing. Yet that
is what most people will demand of the Labour party.
In those circumstances, what do political liberals do? It
has never been obvious, and it is today less obvious than
ever before, that liberals will find the Labour party a
hospitable place. The Labour party is not a liberal party and
it never has been. There may have been a moment, in its
early days, when the trade unionists might have formed a
durable alliance with the radical liberals and a consciously
left-liberal party might have emerged.
But it didn’t. The Labour party became an expressly
social democratic party instead and it is futile for liberals to
decry Labour for not being something it does not claim to
be. For short periods, the Labour party tilts towards that
part of its heritage that derives from the radical liberals. But
not often and not usually for long. So before any attempt at
reconciliation takes place, those of a liberal cast of mind
need to think really hard about whether the act of
persuasion is worth the effort.
Already it is clear that the argument will be wilfully
miscast. Wading through fields of straw men about
individualism, the market state — whatever that is — and the
evils of consumption may just be the price you pay for being
a liberal on the left. No doubt liberals on the right waste as
much time trying to counter derogatory remarks about
immigrants. It makes being a liberal on the left rather
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peculiar. On the right, you can fight xenophobia. On the left
your opponents think we are at our worst when we go
shopping. I wish we had a proper argument to engage in. As
scientists say of a bad theory, this isn’t even wrong.
Let’s be optimistic and say that the attempt to renew
social democracy based on a caricature of New Labour —
and the use of the epithet Blairite as a weapon — will blow
itself open after five years. Then, perhaps, we will get to
where we ought to begin. There should be a moratorium on
the divisions of Blairite and Brownite, Old and New Labour,
left and right, individualist and collectivist. All of them replay
ancient blood-feuds that don’t matter and none of them will
yield anything interesting.
The intriguing axis in Labour politics will be quite
different. There will be, on one side of the argument, those
that genuinely want to disperse power and, on the other,
those that think that central government is usually the
answer. The distinction is not hard and fast. Those who want
to make people powerful do not want to give up the power
of the state. On the contrary, left-liberals are keenly aware
that the power of the state is a potent part of their armoury
— it’s just not their weapon of choice.
There really ought to be a less ugly term than
subsidiarity. But the idea has elegance at least: that power
should be exercised at the lowest possible level. Often that
will not be very low at all. Some problems are global in
scope. Some are best dealt with nationally and some require
power to be transferred directly to the individual. It’s an
empirical question.
Neither does it mean that people cease to be citizens
and become consumers. There are very many ways to
exercise power, most of which have nothing remotely to do
with markets. A liberal republic — which is what I am
describing — creates as many mechanisms for popular
control as possible.
The central objective of the liberal republic is to create
the conditions in which individuals can live as they choose.
We all have our own desires for our own lives that, too often,
we are unable to enact for reasons not of our own making.
This is a central point: who chooses my aims? The liberal
republican says that I do.
Of course those aims have to be compatible with an
identical right on your part to do the same. Of course those
aims cannot be realised unless I have certain resources and
capabilities. There is no point articulating aims that are
beyond possibility. And of course those aims do not
originate in the ether. They will be formed, in part, from my
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membership of certain groups. But it is still my life plan
rather than anyone else’s, even if I didn’t just invent it.
This is the argument that the left needs to have. But
before it can do so there is a prior condition. There needs to
be a serious audit of the time in power, to assess where the
use of state power worked and where it didn’t. There are
more than forty institutions set up since 1997 that have
already been abolished.
This faith in a new unit here and a new coordinating
body there is touching but not very advisable. There is an
unpalatable lesson to be learned: in most cases the use of
the state did not work nearly as well to improve the world as
its advocates thought it would. That is not to say that it did
not work at all, just that the results weren’t usually as good
as anticipated — especially not as a return on the hefty
investment. For social democrats, accepting this means
paying a heavy ideological price. It’s a matter of theory that
it must have worked better than it did.
It is an open question whether the Labour party is
interested even in posing such a question. The great irony is
that those who protect the Prime Minister do so on the
grounds that they hope the Labour party will not turn in on
itself. That is precisely what they are ensuring.
Philip Collins is Chair of Trustees at Demos, co-author of The
Liberal Republic (Demos) and a senior visiting fellow at the
London School of Economics.
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wait for the next St Paul
David Marquand
It is hard to see why anyone outside the narcissistic ranks of
the Labour party should waste mental or emotional energy
worrying about its current state or future prospects. There is
no mystery about the disease that is now killing it. Under
Blair, it made a Faustian pact, not just with one devil but
with two — neoliberalism in economics and charismatic
populism in politics. The combination was astoundingly
successful. Blair’s governments presided over the world’s
most dynamic and inventive financial services sector; a
decade of continuous economic growth, outpacing most of
mainland Europe; steadily rising living standards for the
majority and an unparalleled bonanza for the few; marked
improvement in public services; three successive Labour
victories, two of them crushing, and one more than
adequate; and seemingly unshakeable dominance of the
political middle ground.
Like Thatcher before him, Blair understood
instinctively that in a fluid, shapeless society where class
barriers and party loyalties had dissolved, and where
traditional authority counted for little or nothing, charisma
easily trumped ideology and even principle. But there was a
crucial difference between Blair’s charismatic populism and
Thatcher’s. Thatcher’s was the servant of her crystalline
vision. Blair’s was its own justification. Thatcher was a
revolutionary. She sought to remake society, and she
succeeded in doing so — albeit not always in the way she
had intended. Blair was a consolidator. His only aim was to
win power and keep it; and he saw that the best way to do
so was to soften the rough edges of Thatcher’s legacy so as
to root it more firmly in the nation’s psyche. If anything, he
was even more successful than she had been (though to be
fair, consolidation is inherently easier than revolution).
But in the end, the devils returned to claim their due.
Blair’s charisma was beginning to wear out even before his
fall, just as Thatcher’s had done before hers. And Brown, the
decent, honourable Son of the Manse, could not fill the gap
left by the fallen Blair any more than the decent, honourable
John Major had filled the gap left by the defenestrated
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Thatcher. Blair was one of the great political seducers of
modern British politics, outdoing even Thatcher in that
department, and rivalling Lloyd George. Brown did not want
to be a seducer. He wanted to be an educator, a preacher
and a national moral tutor. In any case, he was not cut out
for seduction. Blair had strewn the Labour Party with
stardust; Brown strewed it with lumps of lead. It’s not his
fault, of course. The commentariat’s incessant attacks on
him for failing to inspire, failing to lead and failing to offer
his country and party a vision are ludicrously unfair. He is
what he is — and what he was when Labour handed him the
leadership on a plate. He doesn’t do visions. He never has.
If the charismatic populist devil were the only one to
have returned, this might not matter. Unfortunately, the
neoliberal devil has returned as well, and in a far more
obtrusive and destructive guise. The economic crisis which
now has the entire globe in its grip is, above all, a crisis of
neoliberalism. The central tenets of the neoliberal 
worldview have crashed as thoroughly as the debt
encumbered banks and hedge funds of London and New
York. Brown’s boast that the days of boom and bust were
over has been exposed as the nonsense it always was. It is
now clear that free markets are not self-regulating as
neoliberal economic theory presupposed. They have to be
regulated, and only public authorities can regulate them.
Economic agents do not base their decisions on rational
calculation. They are driven by greed, credulity, fear and,
above all, the herd instinct.
These are not new discoveries, of course, but the
forces of greed and credulity are so powerful that each
generation has to learn them afresh. Brown has learned
them with astonishing speed. During his ten years as
Chancellor, he rode the waves of the global neoliberal
revolution, not exactly with panache (he doesn’t do panache
either), but with impressive fixity of purpose and sureness of
touch. Now he has turned his back on the dogmas that
guided him in those days with a speed and completeness
that no other world leader has displayed. St Paul on the road
to Damascus was a tyro in comparison.
But St Paul was not just an apostate from orthodox
Judaism. He was a charismatic populist to the nth degree, as
you can find out by reading his epistles. He wove the
resonant, but frequently ambiguous obiter dicta of his new
man-God into a world-class religion. Brown’s conversion has
produced no epistles. He has done the right things, by and
large, but he has not found the right words. In the last
comparable economic crisis, the Great Depression that
began with the Wall Street Crash eighty years ago, Franklin
Roosevelt turned the flank of the neoliberals of that era 
with the epochal phrase, ‘We have nothing to fear but fear
itself.’ At first, his policies were halting and uncertain; it
wasn’t until the rearmament boom at the end of the 
decade that the American economy finally took off. But
Roosevelt understood that, in politics, words matter — that
they often matter more than deeds; that it is through words,
far more than through actions or policies, that the
unthinkable becomes thinkable, and that new political
coalitions are built.
Looked at in that light Labour’s current squabbles
over the leadership are bathetically beside the point. The old
Blairites dream of a second Blair, and it is easy to see why.
But there is — and can be — no second Blair. Charismatic
populism eludes the categories of normal, everyday politics.
It has nothing to do with bureaucratic competence; long
years of apprenticeship are more likely to smother the
qualities it needs than to foster them. Charisma can’t be
passed on from one leader to the next like an old suit. It
strikes like lightning from the sky. Even if he had wanted to
— and, almost by definition, he did not — Blair could not
have trained up a successor in his own mould. Hence the
palpable absurdity of the notion that Alan Johnson or David
Miliband or Harriet Harman could fill the rhetorical void at
the top of the present government. The nearest thing to
Blair in the charisma stakes is David Cameron, not any
member of the Labour party.
What Cameron will do with power when he gets it is
unknowable. But it is a safe bet that he will not fulfil the
blood-curdling expectations of the lumpen left, who have
cast him a Thatcherite red in tooth and claw. He will be
inclusive, irenic and not a little unctuous. There is no way of
telling if that will suffice. Everything depends on the length
and depth of the current crisis, and these too are
unknowable. The one virtual certainty is that, if Cameron
stumbles, Labour will not inherit the crown. Brown has
abandoned the neoliberal gods he worshipped as
Chancellor, and all credit to him. But he has not grasped the
full dimensions of the global crisis. In essence, he has
returned to the Keynesian social democracy of the post-war
period, with its faith in economic growth, fiscal stimuli and
macro-economic manipulation from the centre.
Unfortunately, that is a busted flush. We can’t solve the
problems of the Noughties by going back to the nostrums of
the 1950s and 60s. I don’t think Labour in opposition will
have the wit or the will to jump out of the Keynesian box it
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now inhabits, and to develop a more searching critique of
post-modern capitalism. The great question is whether the
Liberal Democrats and/or the Greens can do so. I think they
may, but it will be a long and painful process.
David Marquand is Chair of the Demos Advisory Council, a
visiting fellow at the Department of Politics, University of
Oxford and Honorary Professor of Politics, University of
Sheffield.
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a society of powerful
people
Tessa Jowell
Without any qualification, I and all my colleagues are in no
doubt about the truly awful election results of last week.
Voters are beyond unhappy, they are angry and if we fail to
recognise and respond to that anger we will deserve
everything that they throw at us.
However, I believe that the worst thing we could do
now is give up, betraying the people who elected us and
leave the scene with the recession still raging and our
political crisis unresolved. The brave, moral and above all the
right thing to do is to face that anger, continue the fight
against the recession and offer a genuine and profound
change in the style and substance of our politics. 
But Labour must first acknowledge the public mood,
be honest about our mistakes, and assert our confidence in
our core values. Then our job is to address the terminal
failure of the old politics and prove that we can offer real
change in how people influence the world around them. And
we must show that Labour can lead the way out of recession
to a stronger, fairer society.
I remain optimistic about the future of progressive
politics in this country but we must react with energy and
ideas. A fearful retreat into inertia would condemn Labour to
being seen as a conservative party, the defenders of the
status quo. Our goals must always be higher than that:
whether that status quo is an indefensible, secretive system
of parliamentary allowances, or public services which fail to
keep pace with people’s rising aspirations.
So our first task is to end the closed, exclusive politics
that so offend people. As Tony Blair said, left and right still
matter but increasingly ‘the divide is between open and
closed’. In our open society information flows ever more
freely, the barriers to association dissolve by the day, and
identity is ours to choose. Contrast that with our closed
politics where power, debate, information and decision-
making are hoarded at the centre, and where the urge to
control is ever-present.
Last week voters told us that they will no longer
tolerate our political closed shop.
Barack Obama’s election showed that when an open
society and an open politics combine, new and unexpected
doors will open for progressive politics. It is that opportunity
— to build an open politics — that I want Labour to seize. 
Fittingly, it was this government move towards greater
openness through the historic Freedom of Information laws
that exposed the horrific excess of a political system that
had been allowed to police itself behind closed doors for too
long — and against which voters recoiled last week. That it is
why it is so vital that a commitment to greater openness —
including an extension of freedom of information — is made
central to the much needed clean up of our politics that we
are now taking forward.
An open politics means that power rests with people
and not institutions. That means our political parties should
be open to those who share our values but do not wish to
join; companies should be open to the involvement of their
employees; and public services should be owned by the
people through a new conception of public ownership. That
is the very essence of progressive Labourism.
The open politics is thus one that lets people in: to our
nation’s political conversation; to our political parties; and to
the way we govern. It is an open politics for an open society.
But it is crucial to see this new and open politics not as a
destination but a constant process. Just as the constitutional
reforms of New Labour’s early years are now part of the
established landscape, the new politics of this year will
become the old politics of next.
Every political instinct — to hand down the tablets
from on high, to reduce risk by retaining control — bridles at
openness. But open politics is one based on optimism,
rooted in confidence in the ability of individuals to bring
about change; belief that the real solutions to problems we
face are found in the communities most affected; and faith
in our capacity as a society for self-government.
It’s easy to talk about openness, but the test is in
bringing it about. First, both politicians and citizens must
find new ways to talk about the choices our society must
take. That means abandoning both the politics of false
choices and the politics of no choices. 
In our early years, New Labour rightly focused on
overcoming a series of pernicious polarisations — between
employer and employee, social progress and economic
progress, public sector and private sector — that were
deeply damaging not just to our image politically, but also to
our ability to govern with competence. 
But our success at overcoming these polarisations
a society of powerful people
92
came at a price. Though we made it seem as if there were
few hard choices, that decisions did not involve tensions and
dilemmas, winners or losers, all of us know that life is not like
this. We know the tensions and dilemmas — at home, in the
workplace, and in the communities in which we live — that
are thrown up by the myriad of choices that we each have
to make every day. 
Now it’s time, not just for politicians but all of us as
citizens, to acknowledge that politics is like this too:
traditional economic growth comes at an environmental
cost; that if the rich grow richer that carries implications for
the overall levels of inequality; that one person’s local
democracy is another’s post-code lottery.
‘Power to the people’ is an easy slogan, but citizenship
requires more from us than simply making our demands to
politicians and then expecting them to go away and resolve
the conflicting interests and viewpoints in a manner wholly
to our liking. 
An open political discourse requires us to discard the
politics of false choices. People don’t believe that one party
has all the answers, we should offer our policies as a means
to illuminate and demonstrate the instincts and values that
we bring to the choices we face. In doing so we put our trust
in voters’ good judgement and let them decide, on the basis
of our values and instincts, who they trust most to wrestle
with the dilemmas we’ll need to resolve in the years ahead.
The second test of an open politics is whether political
parties can find a way to show that we are truly open to the
engagement of the millions of people who don’t want to join
us but want to be involved in crucial decisions. The most
powerful demonstration of that would be to open up the
process by which we select our candidates, including those
for parliament, by introducing open primaries. This provides
an opportunity to strengthen political parties, but political
parties which must have much more porous boundaries.
In the 2005 general election, 380 Labour party
supporters came out to campaign for my re-election in
Dulwich and West Norwood. Less than a third of them were
Labour party members. Many of those who were not had,
however, been drawn into the campaign through their
previous involvement in campaigns on a multitude of local
and community issues. Primaries, therefore, provide an
opportunity for parties to tap this desire which people
continually express to get involved — and link it to a clear
outcome. I believe that if you are willing to register your
support for the Labour party, you should have a say in
selecting the Labour party’s candidates.
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And this is a first step in building a more pluralist
politics: one that recognises that progressive values are
shared more widely than the Labour party and that the
alignment we should be seeking is one of people who share
the same value-driven ambitions for their community, town
and country. It should, therefore, not seek to exclude people
from supporting the candidate who most closely shares
their values and beliefs by the simple fact that they choose
not to join a political party.
For those worried about entryism and infiltration, it is
through widening the circle of participation, not narrowing
it, that we best guard against such risks. As Ben Brandzel, a
veteran of US progressive politics, has argued, ‘mass
movements open to anyone … will always be pulled towards
the commonsense centre. It’s why Wikipedia can self-police
for accuracy, why Obama’s open forums never seriously
embarrassed the candidate and why the London Citizens’
agenda called for things like ensuring the Olympic Village
creates public housing — not erecting statues to Che.’
Progressive Labourism
I have made the case for radical openness. But an open
politics doesn’t end the day the ballot boxes are opened and
the votes are counted. The final test of the open politics,
therefore, lies in how we govern. 
For decades, Labour has cited Aneurin Bevan’s
injunction that ‘the purpose of getting power is to give it
away’ rather more frequently than we have practiced it.
Partly for the genuine fear of responsibility without power,
partly from the pessimistic but persistent belief that ‘the
man in Whitehall knows best’ or even because we feared
individuality, that any gain in power for the individual is a
loss in power for the community.
But the redistribution of power is not a simple zero-
sum game. Strong communities are built by powerful
people. The most fragmented and damaged communities —
those where family breakdown, poverty, crime and drug
abuse are at their highest — are those where individual
aspiration, wealth and educational attainment are at their
lowest. 
Progressive Labourism ascribes not to the
‘centralising’ tradition of socialism identified by GDH Cole in
the early part of the last century, but to his belief in
‘government from below’ and ‘a participatory definition of
freedom’. Progressive Labourism is, therefore, more than the
simple belief that power lies with the people. It is also a
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commitment to the notion that, as Richard Reeves and Phil
Collins argue,1 ‘as individuals we can become authors of our
own lives and, as citizens, we can become co-authors of our
collective lives.’ Thus we recognise the value of collective
power, but also believe that it must serve the ends of
citizens rather than having value in itself: collective power
which negates neither the rights nor the responsibilities of
individual citizens.
The overriding goal of progressive Labourism is to
break down the barriers to participation and ownership in
order to bring about what Cole termed ‘the widest possible
diffusion both of political and economic and social power
and of the knowledge needed for putting such power to
effective use’. 
So how should a progressive Labour government
show its overriding commitment to this task? First, by
building an asset-owning democracy, symbolised by a major
drive to encourage employee ownership. Second, by
developing a more pluralistic notion of public ownership
built around the notion of public service mutualism. Third,
by recognising that so many of the challenges we face
require individual attitudinal and behavioural change and
that government’s role is to encourage a new sense of civic
responsibility.
The near-collapse of the financial sector over the past
year has been a salutary reminder of the power wielded by
markets. This potential threat has long been recognised on
the left but for too many years the left’s response —
nationalisation — appeared to most individual citizens to
simply replace corporate control with state control,
swapping one form of largely unaccountable power with
another. 
New Labour was right to abandon nationalisation in
favour of better regulation and measures to promote more
competition. Policies such as the Child Trust Fund and the
Savings Gateway have put the issue of individual asset
ownership, and thus individual economic power, firmly on
the political agenda. Progressive Labourism requires,
however, that we must go further. In doing so, we can draw
on the inspiration of those Labour revisionists of the 1950s
and 1960s like Tony Crosland who called for a ‘property-
owning democracy’ aimed at spreading private property
ownership and expanding social ownership. 
That desire to exert ownership and control has
growing popular resonance. Given the events of the past
year, it’s no surprise that surveys record that vast majorities
of the public mistrust the financial services industry,
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believing that it puts the interests of shareholders above
those of policyholders. But equally large majorities say they
would be more attracted to a company run by its customers.
And, critically, it accords with the emerging potential
of the post-recession economy: new technologies such as
open source software; the rise of the social investment
industry and its efforts to make pension funds more
accountable for their social and economic effects; the
growing power of the third sector, measured not simply in
the huge investment potential — estimated at some £50 bn
— of charities and trusts, but the aggregate turnover of the
voluntary and community sector which now exceeds that of
the car industry. Partnerships like John Lewis, which have
thrived during the recession, to co-operatives like the
Spanish Mondragon Group with its 100,000 employees, the
renewed appeal of the notion that workers should employ
capital rather than vice versa.
As Geoff Mulgan suggests, the common thread of
each of these developments is their potential to spread
power more widely, to remake capitalism and capital more
clearly as the servant and not the master. A progressive
Labour agenda should seize this opportunity to bring about
a radical shift of economic power to individuals in their
working lives by focusing on the encouragement of greater
employee ownership. 
The sector of the economy that is co-owned — where
employees have a significant stake — already has a turnover
of some £20–£25 billion a year, larger than the agricultural
sector in terms of GDP. And while John Lewis may be the
most famous example there are countless. From professional
services and knowledge businesses such as PA Consulting
and Arup, who designed the wonderful water cube for the
Beijing Olympics, to innovative employee-owned deliverers
of public services like Greenwich Leisure, Sunderland Home
Care Associates and eaga, which provides energy services
to the most vulnerable households.
Employee ownership is the key which unlocks greater
employee participation, and with it not just an excellent
track record in delivering broader social, environmental and
community benefits, but higher rates of productivity and a
capacity to manage innovation and change born of a sense
that these will not be carried out solely at the expense of the
workforce.
For progressive Labourism the appeal of employee
ownership is simple: it is the belief that co-ownership brings
with it a feeling of co-control, an employee’s belief that he
or she can genuinely affect change within their organisation. 
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Progressive Labourism also has confidence in the
ability of individuals to bring about change in our public
services. This is why I believe that individual budgets and
the principle which lies beneath them — that citizens should
have control over the services provided for them — are so
potentially transformative. 
As Charlie Leadbeater argues,2 individual budgets
provide the chance, ‘to mobilise a democratic intelligence:
the ideas, know-how and energy of thousands of people to
devise solutions rather than relying on a few policymakers to
come up with the best approach.’ 
The evidence so far is compelling that those with
individual budgets are more satisfied, outcomes are better
and costs are lower. The reason is simple: highly
participative services don’t simply unleash the power of
service users, thus multiplying the resources available, the
solutions they offer are more effective because they are
tailored to individual needs and aspirations. In the face of
tight public expenditure rounds in the years ahead, the
question thus becomes can we afford not to radically
increase the scope and extent of individual budgets?
But progressive Labourism also demands a deeper
redefinition of the ownership of public institutions. For most
of the last century, Labour’s clause IV commitment to
‘common ownership’ was taken to mean state or municipal
ownership, despite the efforts of its author, Sidney Webb, to
suggest that the party was free to choose other ‘forms of
popular administration and control’. While New Labour has
rightly opened the door to new providers — both private
and third sector — our next challenge should be to define a
more pluralist conception of ‘public ownership’.
I believe that just as employee ownership offers the
opportunity to spread power more widely in the economy,
mutualism — the notion that organisations should be owned
by, and run for the benefit of, their current and future
members — provides similar possibilities in the realm of
public services. Mutuals are, of course, familiar to all of us
through the work of building societies, co-operatives,
friendly societies and mutual insurers and the recent growth
of football supporters’ trusts, child care co-operatives and
leisure service mutuals. 
However, the most significant step in terms of the
public sector has been provided by NHS foundation trusts.
In the four years since their creation, foundation hospitals
have provided a template for a quiet revolution in our public
services: delivering healthcare controlled and run locally,
giving staff, local communities and other stakeholders a far
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bigger voice. This bringing together of staff, patients and
public shows how a new conception of common ownership
can replace the producer versus consumer polarisation of
old. 
Foundation trusts have not been captured by ‘special
interests’. Turnouts in elections for the membership of trusts
often exceed those in local elections and, in total, the 107
foundation trusts have a membership over one million. But
most importantly, research shows that patient and public
involvement has changed the way hospitals are run, making
them more responsive to local people and more focused on
patients’ needs. 
The key features of the mutual model — established
for a shared community purpose, owned by members and
operating a democratic voting system — should now be
applied further, not just to schools and hospitals, but also to
local community facilities, ranging from youth and children’s
centres to parks and sports clubs.
Civic responsibility
We should always remember that issues ranging from
climate change and energy use to obesity, binge drinking,
tax avoidance and benefit fraud require individual attitudinal
and behavioural change. Of course, laws and regulations
have their part to play. But, as Martin Kettle has written, the
public interest requires something else: that those involved
— whether in banking, or baby care, food safety or farming
to recognise the need to behave well without being bound
by rules. 
With good reason, many people dislike lectures from
politicians on good behaviour. But government can seek to
encourage and reward what Matthew Taylor terms ‘pro-
social behaviour’. Seeing the thousands of people who each
month register to become volunteers at the Olympics, I
believe a non-compulsory, locally run voluntary service
scheme might find many willing hands. Such a scheme could
help, during a period when money will be tight and demand
will be growing, to boost areas such as childcare and the
care available to the elderly (and, over the long term, to
assist many of those who wish to remain in their own
homes). 
It might also focus on specific, locally decided
objectives, like the creation of after-school sports clubs or
summer school programmes to provide enhanced learning
opportunities for children falling behind at school and
children who speak English as a foreign language. Or it
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might build a network of mentors to help those trying to
start and grow new businesses, charities or social
enterprises, but who may lack the skills necessary to achieve
their objectives. 
The scheme should be open to all, with school leavers,
recent graduates, those seeking work (including the many
professionals who have lost their job in the recession), and
those near or at retirement particularly encouraged, but in
no way compelled, to participate. 
All these cases bring to light what I believe will
become the new divide in our politics: between those
impatient to build the new, open politics, and those
determined to cling for as long as possible to the old, closed
politics. Fundamentally, it is a simple divide, based on a
simple choice: do you favour powerful institutions or
powerful people? Each of the ideas: — open primaries,
employee ownership, public service mutualism — are linked
by a common belief that the promotion of open institutions,
open to the ownership, participation and involvement of
people, is the next stage of progressive politics. 
Tessa Jowell is MP for Dulwich and West Norwood, Minister
for the Cabinet Office and the Olympics and Paymaster
General.
Notes
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